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100 YEARS OF CONFLICT: THE PAST AND




In the 1970s insurance companies, tobacco interests, and large
industry launched a political campaign attacking the American civil
justice system.' Unlike previous reform efforts that sought to change
rules of law through case-by-case adjudication in the courts, the self-
styled tort "reform" movement pursued a much grander vision:
transforming the cultural understanding of civil litigation, and
especially personal injury lawsuits, by attacking the system itself.
Success would be measured not by remaking formal rules of law
through conventional litigation or even legislation but by changes to
the public perception of how the civil justice system operates.
"Tort reform"-or "retrenchment"-advocates seek to persuade
the public through advertising and lobbying that the civil justice
system is corrupted; that its operations constrict the economy; that
lawyers foment excessive litigation; that juries and judges
systematically tilt towards sympathetic individual plaintiffs and
against businesses in awarding large money judgments. The result?
Astronomical liability insurance premiums and businesses reluctant
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1. See, e.g., THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL
RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 23-24 (2002);
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Impact That It Has Had Is Between
People's Ears: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (2000).
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to take risk. The unique contribution of the tort retrenchment
movement is a judgment that earlier losses over the content of tort
law could be reconfigured and refought in a new arena, the court of
public opinion. Marrying political savvy honed over decades of
legislative lobbying to marketing skills developed in the context of
retail sales of goods and services, proponents of tort reform made the
strategic choice to politicize the content of tort rules in a very public
effort to undermine the civil justice system.
The decision to engage the public and politicians in explicit
discussions about the content of legal rules, however, did not directly
reengage the battles that had been lost in decades of legal decision
making by courts in a wide variety of contexts. Instead, the goal was
to bring a frontal assault on the system itself.2 Before the tort reform
movement galvanized conservative politicians in the 1970s and
1980s, most nonlawyers had no idea what a "tort" was. By the
1990s, however, the Republican Vice President of the United States
could give speeches proclaiming that the tort system was broken, and
that his party was prepared to fix it.3 The 1994 Republican "Contract
with America" promised Americans that, if Republicans took control
of Congress, one of ten key agenda items would be changing the
civil justice system.
4
This Article holds that tort retrenchment represents one
manifestation of business and industrial reaction to social, political,
and economic forces that transformed the American civil justice
system during the first three quarters of the twentieth century. The
tort retrenchment movement is reacting to key losses suffered in
battles over the content of tort law during the last century. As an
organized political force, the movement is merely part of the ebb and
flow of the political forces that have shaped American tort law
2. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 466-70 (discussing public
relations campaigns in the 1970s-1980s designed to launch attacks on the civil
litigation system).
3. Vice President Dan Quayle, Remarks at the Meeting of the American
Bar Association, Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 13, 1991) (transcript available through
the Office of the President), http://www.vicepresidentdanquayle.com/speeches
_StandingFirmABA_ 1.html.
4. See "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort
Reform, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1769 (1996) [hereinafter Common Sense];
see also infra Part II.
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during the last century. Our thesis is that contemporary political
battles over tort law are best understood if situated against the
backdrop of those earlier battles over the content of tort law. We
also suggest that those who wish to defend the civil justice system
against retrenchment should explicitly address how the legal system
changed from 1900 to 1980 to grant far more protections to citizens.
In order to understand the movement for "reform" of the civil
justice system, therefore, it will be useful to situate the politics of tort
reform within a broader context. For example, one can trace the
movement for caps on damages to the decades-long battle over
recognizing psychic harm as worthy of compensation within the civil
justice system.5 One can trace the medical community's antipathy
towards trial lawyers to developments within tort law that abandoned
the locality rule of practice-that effectively undermined the
"conspiracy of silence" and enabled incompetent physicians to
continue practicing-and in effect held doctors to a national standard
of care.
6
Moreover, one can trace increased business insurance rates not
only to statutory torts banning employment discrimination such as
sex harassment but also to the removal of immunities that barred
worthy suits against wrongdoing by charities and governmental
agencies at the courthouse doors.7 For example, the current crop of
lawsuits against the Catholic Church for sheltering known child
molesters would not have been possible under the earlier regime.
Finally, contemporary battles over "joint and several liability" can be
linked to the losing wars industry groups fought to limit their
exposure to Super fund liability under the Comprehensive
5. See infra Part III.D.
6. See infra Part III.B.2.
7. See generally Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation for Harm from
Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402-05 (1991) (discussing the
deleterious effect that abolition of the charitable immunity doctrine had on
insurance premiums for organizations staffed with volunteers); Jeffrey D.
Kahn, Comment, Organizations' Liability for Torts of Volunteers, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 1433, 1436-47 (1985) (describing the trend toward abolishing the
charitable immunity doctrine and the increased tendency of the insurance
industry to deny coverage to charitable organizations or impose high premiums
upon them); Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental
Charities-Modern Status, 25 A.L.R.4th 517 (1983) (describing the history
and abrogation of the charitable immunity doctrine).
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Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
8(CERCLA), and to major class actions remedying massive damages
created by asbestos, toxic torts, and consumer products such as IUDs
and Bendectin.
9
So situated, then, the contemporary political battles over tort
reform can be explicitly linked to the politics of an earlier era that at
one time was confined to debates in the courtroom. By bringing
debates over substantive law into the political arena, tort reformers
have made explicit what was once implicit: competing forces that
marshal arguments from political, economic, moral, and social
theory shape the content of tort rules. Tort reformers endorse what
an earlier generation of progressive reformers, the legal realists,
asserted: tort law results from the competition among different
political interests to establish the background operating rules within
the society that allocate power and distribute losses among those
interest groups.' 0 The rules of tort are so important, in other words,
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). Section 9607 of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
commonly known as Superfund, imposes joint and several liability on
four categories of responsible parties for cleaning up contamination caused
by hazardous substances. Id. § 9607. Congress enacted CERCLA on
December 11, 1980. Environmental Protection Agency, CERCLA Overview,
at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/law/cercla.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2005). CERCLA taxed the chemical and petroleum industries. Id. It also
granted federal authority to respond directly to releases, or threatened releases,
of hazardous substances at risk of endangering the public's health or the
environment. Id.
9. See infra Part III.A.1-5.
10. See generally K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW
AND ITS STUDY 111-14 (1951) (discussing the role of law in organized
civilization); Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553,
583-85 (1933) (discussing the role of contract theory in enabling courts to
distribute gains and losses among parties); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (1976)
(exploring the connection "between the 'erosion of the rigid rules of the late
nineteenth century theory of contractual obligation' and the 'socialization of
our theory of contract.... ."); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-246
(1992) (exploring the theories underpinning legal realism and its impact on
modem legal thought); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 467 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:
1927-1960) (discussing legal realism as a critique of social power and as a
justification for law's role in undermining theories of self-regulation)); Robert
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that what may appear to represent esoteric, interstitial rules or gap-
filling concepts instead themselves structure social and economic
power and thus entail significant distributional consequences. Thus,
the politics of contemporary tort reform replicates the politics of the
earlier battles, but in a different forum and employing a vastly
different rhetoric.
Our discussion of these ideas is broken into three parts. First,
we will give a brief history of the contemporary tort reform
movement, the political movement of the last thirty years led by
insurance and industry interests to transform the American civil
justice system.
Second, we will outline some of the key developments within
the civil justice system that took place over the first decades of the
twentieth century, and against which the contemporary tort reform
movement is reacting. This discussion comes with some caveats:
tort reformers might not want to associate proposed reform of the
civil justice system with other reactive proposals to roll back major
civil law developments, such as civil rights laws banning sex
harassment, the reinstatement of immunities protecting vicious
husbands and negligent charities from suit, and the total bar of
contributory negligence. Not all tort reformers wish to reestablish
those immunities permitting husbands to beat their wives with
impunity, or hospitals or schools to injure patients or students
seriously with no possibility of redress. One of the theses of this
paper, however, is that the retrenchment movements are linked to
each other both politically and philosophically. In turn, the
arguments that resulted in increased protections given to women,
L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603
(1943) (explaining the law's role in equalizing relations between parties of
otherwise unequal bargaining power); Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts,
Combination and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196 (1946) (explaining
tort law's role in imposing obligations on parties to behave in ways that would
sometimes not be the result of free bargaining will); Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 838-42 (1935) (discussing the role that legal concepts should play in
guiding realistic judges to weigh the conflicting human values presented in
every case); Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927) (advocating that law should play a more prominent role in allocating
power between individuals and behemoth economic interests).
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children, workers, patients, and those injured by faulty products or
concealed toxic dumps are linked as well.
In the final section of the paper, we will sketch some of the key
challenges that face both tort reformers and defenders of the civil
justice system. Those who wish to defend the civil justice system
from the political challenges posed by tort retrenchment, we argue,
will be best served if they explicitly connect the current politics of
tort reform to those earlier (and successful) legal battles that shaped
the content of those tort rules now under political challenge.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF "TORT REFORM"
Tort law has been described as "a battleground of social
theory."" History reveals this statement's truth as social values
continue to influence the creation of new tort duties and the
reinforcement of existing duties. Tort reform, in the sense of the
word that refers to "progress, improvement, and the correction of
abuse or imperfection,"'12 actually has its roots in the Progressive Era
of legal scholarship following World War I, during which time
criticism was leveled at the tort system's deficiency in adequately
compensating injured plaintiffs. 13  Prior to that time, substantial
barriers blocked access to the legal system, such as tort laws creating
substantial defenses for employers in response to claims by injured
workers, and a legal maze that made claims virtually impossible for
people with limited financial resources. 14 Contributory negligence,
the fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk are just a few
examples of doctrines that weighed against injured plaintiffs seeking
redress. ' 5 At that time, ostensibly "frivolous lawsuits" did not appear
11. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at 14 (3d
ed. 1964).
12. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 651 n.10
(1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)) (noting the "uncomfortable position" in which
opponents of tort reform find themselves, given the traditional meaning
attributed to "reform." Reform organizations, such as the American Tort
Reform Association, "have made full use of the term" to characterize their
desired "pro-defendant tort-rule modifications").
13. See, e.g., Common Sense Legislation, supra note 4, at 1766.
14. See Page, supra note 12, at 656.




on the radar of critics, since much of the existing common law was
pro-defendant and mechanisms to screen out meritless suits were
available. 16  Remnants of the Progressive Era include broader
application of strict liability principles, 17 as well as the doctrine of
joint and several liability, 18 and the legislatively enacted workers'
compensation system. 19
Tort rights expanded in the post-World War II era, particularly
during the period 1960-1980, in part due to the elimination of
defendant-friendly immunities and defenses, the adoption of strict
liability, and an "'emerging concern about toxic exposures and a
broader-based rise in claims consciousness on the part of the
public."' 20 This period, lasting roughly from 1945-1980, has been
described as the "Democratic Expansionary Era" in which plaintiff-
friendly tort expansion occurred following two centuries of law
favorable to society's wealthy and educated elite.2 1  Judicially
16. See Common Sense, supra note 4, at 1779. But see Gary T. Schwartz,
Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981) (offering the opposing view
that early tort law "exhibited a keen concern for victim welfare").
17. See Common Sense, supra note 4, at 1766-67.
18. See John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tort
Feasors Be Abolished, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193, 193-97 (1986).
19. See generally 1 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION § 2.07-08 (2001) (chronicling the history of workers'
compensation law in the United States. By 1920 all but eight states had
adopted workers' compensation statutes, with Hawaii being the last state to
create a system in 1963. Id. § 2.08); Richard A. Epstein, The Historical
Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L.
REV. 775, 797-803 (describing the features of the English Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1897, which served as a model for statutes in the United
States). Admittedly, some pro-plaintiff strides were made around the time of
World War I. For instance, Judge Cardozo permitted a plaintiff to recover
from the manufacturer of a defective wheel that collapsed while driving, even
though the plaintiff was not in privity with the negligent manufacturer, since
the resulting danger was foreseeable. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111
N.E. 1050, 1051-55 (N.Y. 1916).
20. Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in
Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 537 (2001) (quoting
Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 853 (1992)).
21. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster:
The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 38 (2002).
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recognized special relationships, gender-based torts, the abolition of
contributory negligence and adoption of comparative negligence
statutes, a strict rule for injuries resulting from defective,
unreasonably dangerous products,2 2 and premises liability23 all paved
the way for a tort liability system allocating a greater share of
accident losses to business and corporate interests.
Beginning in the 1960s, the tort system underwent dramatic
upheaval, with judges recognizing new duties for landowners,
physicians, and the general public. 4  Notably, courts abandoned
privity of contract as a requirement for recovering under the theory
of implied warranty of merchantability. 25  Judicial decisions
influenced by the theory of enterprise liability might have also
contributed to the increase in opportunities for injured plaintiffs to
recover. 6  The gradual increase in pro-plaintiff rights through
common law torts sprung not only from judicial action, but also in
22. See Page, supra note 12, at 653 & n.22 (citing Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (1963) ("holding manufacturer of
combination power tool strictly liable in tort for harm caused by defective
product")).
23. See Rustad, supra note 20, at 536-37.
24. See generally Part III; see also Page, supra note 12, at 652 n. 19
(referencing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (landowners
owed duty of reasonable care to all entrants, regardless of status); Natanson v.
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106, reh "g denied, 354 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. 1960)
(physician owed duty to inform patient of material risks inherent in treatment
or surgery); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32 (N.Y. 1961) (duty to
refrain from negligently inflicting mental distress that results in physical harm
even when no physical impact on plaintiff's body)).
25. See, e.g., Page, supra note 12, at 691-92 (discussing Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), in which the court allowed
the wife of a purchaser of a car to recover from the auto's retailer and
manufacturer for injuries sustained when the steering wheel failed, even
though the wife was not in privity with either tortfeasor).
26. See id. at 663 & n.82. "The theory of enterprise liability postulates that
[businesses providing goods and services] should bear the losses associated
with [those products] without regard to negligence." Id. Essentially,
enterprise liability proposes a social welfare mechanism that spreads losses
according to the most efficient manner possible. See George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundation of Modern American Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 517
(1985); see also Steven Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution:
The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 706-12
(1993).
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response to the arguments put forth by attorneys advocating for
injured plaintiffs, who vigorously pointed to rules that were unfair,
illogical, or inconsistent with goals of tort liability.
27
Since the late 1960s, however, several waves of tort
retrenchment have swept the nation's legal system, presumably
reacting to what was perceived as an expansion of tort rights and a
corresponding, though unwelcome, increase in liability. 28 Each wave
has been marked by one or more private sector industries blaming
common law tort liability and litigiousness for a crisis-level rise in
insurance premiums and policy cancellations, as well as other
financially deleterious occurrences. 29 While scholars and the courts
were largely responsible for shaping prior changes to tort law, the
movement self-described as tort reform was and remains "fueled by
the economic self-interest of those who perceive themselves as
adversely affected by the tort system."
30
In the first wave of retrenchment, businesses sought changes in
rules of law, but, as noted earlier, the general public, more so than
courts, were the target of the efforts at persuasion. Since the 1970s,
corporate interests employed public relations campaigns to establish
a jaundiced view of the civil litigation system in order to change the
perspectives of both policy makers and jury members. 31 Hence, as
commentators have suggested:
More than just the formal legal changes it seeks, tort reform
has always been about altering the cultural environment
surrounding civil litigation-e.g., what is perceived as an
injury; whether and whom to blame for an injury; what to
do about it; and even how to respond to what others
27. See Page, supra note 12, at 654. The growth of a trial attorneys' bar
association placed pressure on the adoption of judicial doctrines more
favorable to plaintiffs. Id.
28. Common Sense, supra note 4, at 1767.
29. See id. (discussing the medical industry crisis of the late 1960s,
commonly attributed to a rise in negligence claims, a rise in liability premiums
for manufacturers in the 1970s, and a widespread insurance crisis in the 1980s
marked by financial losses and cancellation of policies previously issued to
high-risk insureds). The most recent wave has persisted since the 1980s, and
built considerable speed in the mid-1990s when reform efforts began
resurfacing en masse. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 32.
30. Page, supra note 12, at 654.
3 1. Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 453.
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(especially plaintiffs and their lawyers) do with regard to
naming and blaming.
32
These campaigns led to many legislative changes in most of the
states during the 1970s. Fourteen states passed laws encouraging
arbitration; twenty-nine created screening panels for lawsuits; twenty
limited contingency fees; fourteen capped damages; and nineteen
restricted the collateral source rule (which does not reduce a
plaintiff's award by monies received from third parties).33
Moreover, no fewer than forty-three states and two territories enacted
legislation to modify common law standards by limiting malpractice
liability for health care providers.34  Lastly, a number of states
adopted no-fault automobile insurance systems in the wake of the
perceived premium crisis.
35
In the mid-80s, a second wave of increased insurance premiums
hit multiple sectors, including the automotive and health care
36industries. In response, industry associations and corporate
entities, primarily in the insurance arena, set out on an intense
polling campaign to gage the consuming public's opinion on a range
of issues related to the civil justice system.37 Polls sponsored by
organizations such as the Insurance Information Institute, the All-
Industry Research Council, the American Council of Life Insurance,
and Aetna Insurance Company helped generate rhetoric that
continues to be used in retrenchment campaigns today. 38  The
public's responses to the polls reflected a sense of an unfair civil
system overwrought with frivolous suits and burdened by excessive
costs. 39 In general, poll responses indicated that the public attributed
problems with the system to moral failings such as greed and lack of
personal responsibility and honesty.40 The polls reflected the
32. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
33. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 31.
34. Common Sense, supra note 4, at 1768 (quoting Peter A. Bell,
Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice, 35
SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 943 (1984)).
35. E.g., Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral
Values, 1995 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1207, 1216.
36. See id. at 1220.
37. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 462.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 462-64.
40. Id. at 464.
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perception that unless the system was fixed, the public would end up
paying the price for these problems.4' Of course, the values
seemingly violated by this civil justice system gone awry were
"implicitly built into the polls through the questions asked.
42
As in the 1970s, state legislatures responded to a rapid rise in
liability insurance rates by enacting measures that capped pain and
suffering damages, limited punitive damages, restricted the collateral
source rule, and modified or eliminated joint and several liability
rules.4 3  In 1986 alone, forty-one of forty-six state legislatures
enacted some type of tort reform measure.44  Melding fact with
opinion in a manner to support pro-defendant reforms materialized in
other ways during this time. For example, Peter Huber broadly
criticized tort law in his 1988 book, Liability: The Legal Revolution
and Its Consequences, in which he proposed a return to contract law
as the predominant mechanism for individuals to retain their rights
and exercise their duties.
45
Moreover, Huber coined the term "tort tax," a now oft-repeated
pejorative used to describe the alleged increase built into the price of
goods and services to reflect the risk of liability.46 The 1980s also
marked a turning point in the judicial arena as state court judges
recoiled from attempts further to expand tort rights.47 Moreover, in
states where judges were elected rather then nominated, private
entities expended considerable resources on swaying judges'
opinions to support a tort system favorable to their interests.
48
Despite the array of activities carried out by business in the
name of tort reform, the changes through the 1980s tended to be
41. See id. at 463-64 (showing the results of 1986 and 1987 joint surveys
by Harris and Associates, Aetna and Roper, and All-Industry Research
Council).
42. Id. at 465.
43. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 32.
44. See id.
45. Page, supra note 12, at 659-61 (discussing HUBER, supra note 12).
Huber's book was met with praise by publications such as the Wall Street
Journal and Forbes magazine, though Page points to more than a few factual
and legal inconsistencies in the publication. Id. at 660 & n.68.
46. See id. at 663.
47. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 53.
48. See id. at 54.
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piecemeal. 49 The retrenchment movement's greatest impact has been
on shaping public opinion in creating a sense of crisis and,
sometimes irrational, fear of lawsuits, rather than changing the tort
system through legislative and judicial action. 50 The majority.of tort
reform measures that have managed to succeed have occurred in
state legislatures, whereas reforms at the federal level have-at least
until 2005-encountered more obstacles. 51 Not until the second
George Bush won a second term in 2004 did the retrenchment
movement appear to have a major opportunity to enact legislation at
the federal level.
The effort to nationalize tort law can be seen as a "third wave"
of tort retrenchment. Some might enjoy the irony of Republican
proposals to nationalize tort law by the same Party that embraced
"state's rights" rhetoric to explain its opposition to much civil rights
legislation enacted during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless,
the effort to nationalize significant aspects of tort law is well
underway, and has been endorsed by major business interests.
During the first Bush administration (1988-92), then Vice-
President Dan Quayle made tort reform a national political issue
when he labeled the civil justice system a "self-inflicted competitive
disadvantage" in a 1991 speech before the American Bar
Association. 52  Quayle proposed as many as fifty anti-litigation
reforms put forth by the President's Council on Competitiveness.
53
While none of the reforms were implemented as federal legislation
during George H.W. Bush's administration, retrenchment has
49. See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional
Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 185 (1987).
50. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 1, at 30 ("[T]ort reformers have made
steady gains in the cultural war over litigation even as they have often lost
particular political and legal battles."); Talk of the Nation. How Fear of
Litigation Has Changed the Way People Work and Live, (National Public
Radio, Dec. 18, 2003), http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/36.pdf (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005).
51. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 30-31. See generally American Tort
Reform Ass'n, State Reforms, at http://www.atra.org/states (highlighting
reforms since 1986, with the vast majority of reforms reported occurring at the
state level) (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
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become a staple platform position of the Republican party ever
since.54 The Republican Party further elevated retrenchment to the
national level after gaining control of both Houses of Congress in
1994, and making Tenet Nine of the Contract with America a
mobilizing point for legal reform.
55
Yet, a series of attempts to pass so-called "Common Sense tort
reform bills" in the mid-1990s achieved only limited success.
56
Despite tort retrenchment's primary position in the political
limelight, none of the forty-six medical malpractice reform bills
introduced into Congress between 1990-1994 passed.57 Other reform
laws that did pass during President Clinton's administration from
1992-2000 tended to be minor in scope: limiting the liability of
small airplane manufacturers; immunizing volunteers from litigation
(but leaving their host organizations open to liability); taxing tort
awards for emotional distress and punitive damages; and capping tort
liability for Amtrak at $200 million per accident.58 Although the
"Common Sense" legal reforms met with success in the Republican-
dominated Houses during the 1995-96 Congressional sessions, they
were eventually reduced to amended step reforms or eliminated
entirely by presidential veto.
59
Attempts to alter substantive tort law at both state and federal
levels continue in 2005, and show no signs of abatement. In his
State of the Union speech inaugurating his second term, President
Bush endorsed three significant retrenchment bills.60  The first,
requiring removal of many class actions to federal court, was enacted
in the first weeks of the 109th Congress, with Bush signing it into
54. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 25.
55. See Common Sense, supra note 4, at 1769. Tenet Nine called for limits
on punitive damages, product liability reform, and adopting the English rule of
attorney fee-shifting, where the loser pays fees and costs. Id.
56. Id. at 1770-71.
57. See BURKE, supra note 1, at 31.
58. See id.
59. See Common Sense, supra note 4, at 1765 n.3; see also H.R. 956,
104th Cong. (1995), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binibdquery/z?d104:HR00956
:@@@L&summ2=m&#summary (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (bill and
summary status of H.R. 956).
60. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
20050202-11 .html).
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law on February 18, 2005.61 A second bill, which the Republican
Party has proposed and Bush promises to sign, would cap non-
economic medical malpractice damages at $250,000. 62 The third
major change would impose limits on asbestos liability. 63 Political
prognosticators predict likely enactment of the second two bills as
61. The legislation stalled in the Senate in 2004, but passed in both Houses
in February 2005, with President Bush signing the legislation shortly
thereafter. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-002, 119
Stat. 4 (2005). The legislation reflects what at least one scholar warns is a
subtler, though potentially more impacting, retrenchment that aims to achieve
substantive tort changes through federal procedural law. See JoEllen Lind,
"Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 718-19 (2004). Professor Lind
labels attempts at the national level to displace substantive law historically
reserved to the states, "Procedural Swift," pointing in particular to the
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, and the Class Action Fairness
Act ("CAFA") of 2003. Id. CAFA, as enacted in 2005, grants federal district
courts original jurisdiction over class actions if the amount in controversy
exceeds $5 million and less than one-third of the plaintiffs are from the same
state as the defendants. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (February 18,
2005). It also limits the recovery of contingent fees by attorneys in settlements
where plaintiffs are awarded coupons, establishes guidelines that federal
district courts are to follow before approving settlements, and specifies
requirements for serving notice of proposed settlements on federal and state
officials. Id.
62. HEALTH Act of 2005, S. 354, 109th Cong. §§ 4-5 (2005) (setting a
statute of limitations for any health care liability claim, regardless of the theory
of liability, and limiting the recovery of non-economic damages to $250,000,
including damages for emotional pain, suffering, disfigurement, and hedonic
damages); see also American Medical Association (AMA), Physician Action
Kit Sign-Up, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/10155.html (last
updated Jan. 19, 2005). The American Medical Association's "Physician
Action Kit" is a ready-made packet enabling medical professionals to
"mobilize physicians and patients in the fight to pass real medical liability
reform legislation in the U.S. Congress." Id. One of AMA's most recently
stated top priorities is professional liability reform. See AMA, Key Objectives,
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/1912.html (last updated
November 2, 2004).
63. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/
02/20050202-11.html) ("our economy is held back by irresponsible class-
actions and frivolous asbestos claims-and I urge Congress to pass legal
reforms this year."); see also 151 CONG. REC. S1009-42 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
2005) (statement of Rep. Specter). The bill seeks to establish a victims' trust
fund capped at $140 billion, and would compensate only those workers who
can show proof of existing harm due to asbestos exposure. Id.
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well, since the Republicans control both houses of Congress as well
as the Presidency.
Enjoying such success, the tort retrenchment movement is likely
to push for ever-greater changes to the civil justice system at both the
state and federal level. But, what galvanized the tort retrenchment
movement? Against what legal changes is the movement once again
to transform the civil justice system reacting? In the next section, we
describe in detail the types of changes that took place during the first
decades of the 20th Century. We suggest that the tort retrenchment
movement was spawned as a reaction to these changes in the legal
system.
III. 20TH CENTURY SOCIAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT
SHAPED THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Tort retrenchment arose as a reaction to a series of social and
legal developments over the first three quarters of the Twentieth
Century. In this Section, we set out five of the major developments
that have shaped the American civil justice system. These five
developments, we suggest, are the key issues with which tort
reformers have yet to contend, but tort system challengers and
defenders cannot ignore them because these issues have both shaped
the American civil justice system, and are inextricably linked to the
philosophical arguments of retrenchment. 64 In addition, the politics
of retrenchment aligns the losers of the earlier battles against those
groups who benefited from the earlier battles. Thus, it makes sense
to review the earlier battles in order better to understand against what
the current political movement is reacting.
The five developments are: (1) major social harms litigated
through the civil justice system; (2) expansion of consumer and
employee rights; (3) expansion of duties to protect others; (4)
recognition of emotional harm as a significant and compensable loss;
and (5) a dramatic increase in business-vs.-business tort litigation.
64. Many defenders of the current tort system have not explicitly addressed
how the ultimate goal of tort reform seeks to return the civil justice system to
an earlier time, thus rolling back many of the progressive doctrinal
developments within tort law that characterized the 1960's and 1970's. A
major exception is the recent book, THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L.
RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001).
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Much of that within the civil justice system against which
retrenchers rail reflects the compromises over these issues rendered
by thousands of judicial opinions over many decades. Perhaps it
goes without saying that the same political and economic forces that
lost the earlier battles over the rules of tort law have reconfigured
themselves as tort reformers, seeking from public opinion and
legislative action what was earlier lost in the courtroom.
A. Major Social Harms Litigated Through the
Civil Justice System
The United States does not have a comprehensive social
insurance system through which injured persons can receive
compensation for injuries suffered by products or accidents.65 As a
result, the civil justice system serves as the default mechanism for
redress of such injuries. This compensatory function, although
limited in scope, continues to be an important justification of the
civil justice system.
In addition to providing a mechanism for compensating injured
persons, the tort system plays another important role: the default
regulator of safety and economic power.66  Although the United
States economy produces millions of products and systematically
intersects with millions of lives on a daily basis, most of these
products and processes are not regulated outside of the civil justice
system.67  With a few exceptions like the Food and Drug
65. Although injured workers can receive limited compensation through
Workers Compensation systems in place in every state, those programs cover
only workplace-related injuries, which comprise just a fraction of actual
injuries that occur each year. Additionally, some injured parties have
purchased or are covered by health, life, or accident insurance policies.
Reimbursements received from such insurance hinges on the terms of contracts
negotiated outside the context of particular injuries, and often bear little
relationship to the injuries victims suffer.
66. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Jury, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 61 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
67. While the FDA regulates and approves a large volume of biological
products, cosmetics, drugs, food, and medical devices, entire industries such as
the herbal supplement industry remain largely unregulated by the FDA or other
administrative agencies. For example, the FDA has authority to regulate
herbal supplements only after the products have reached the market, with few
exceptions. FDA, Dietary Supplements: Overview, at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/
-dms/supplmnt.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). In 2003, sales of herbal
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Administration, which has authority to approve, regulate, or ban the
sale of drugs,68 the products and processes of the most complex
industrial economy in the world are regulated, if at all, through the
civil justice system. In short, tort law establishes the background
operating rules under which the social and economic system
operates. As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it in an earlier context, the
civil justice system establishes the ground rules for interactions in
which persons across different classes compete in the "struggle for
life' 6 9 and "victory in the battle of trade. 70
In the 1960s and 1970s, the tort system experienced a dramatic
increase in class action litigation over widespread instances of social
injury, as distinguished from individual injury. The environmental
movement highlighted toxic dumps and polluting factories; the
prevalence of compelling marketing campaigns led to the use or
ingestion of toxic products that produced devastating injuries; and
the public became more aware of how careless corporations could
contaminate their natural world. Nearly a dozen products whose
safety was litigated during the 1970s and 1980s affected more than a
quarter of a million people.7' One product alone, asbestos, marketed
as though safe, but known for decades by its major manufacturer to
supplements amounted to $20.1 billion and at least 16% of Americans use
these products. Jane Spencer, The Risks of Mixing Drugs and Herbs, WALL
ST. J., June 22, 2004, at Dl, 2004 WL-WSJ 56932593. Due to the lack of
legislative approval for increased FDA regulation of herbal supplements, civil
litigation is one of the few avenues through which to bring attention to and
obtain recourse for the injuries caused by these products.
68. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (2004).
69. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106-07 (1896) (Holmes, C.J.,
dissenting).
If the policy on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in
the term free competition, we may substitute free struggle for life. [It]
is not limited to struggles between persons of the same class
competing for the same end. It applies to all conflicts of temporal
interests .... [T]he policy of allowing free competition justifies the
intentional inflicting of temporal damage... when the damage is
done.., in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade.
Id. See also O.W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1894).
70. See Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 106.
71. See Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and
Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 179, 193-94 fig. 3 (2001).
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cause serious health problems to those exposed to its fibers, has
adversely affected the health of millions of Americans.72 Although
the civil justice system had not previously been employed to address
widespread social injuries caused by industry, creative lawyers
crafted tort lawsuits to bring to trial those who were allegedly
responsible, and to force billions of dollars of payments to millions
of victims.
The transformation of the civil justice system, from one in
which garden variety disputes were adjudicated into one in which
major segments of the entire society could become embroiled in
litigation, transformed the public's understanding of the civil justice
system. It also had a draining effect on the coffers of those held or
thought responsible for creating or expanding the scope of harm to
the public. This transformation of the civil justice system from small
claims court to a redistributive agency had a profound impact on the
business community.
Importantly, the civil justice system did not create these social
harms; instead, the legal system addressed them. But, from the
standpoint of businesses sued for complex injuries such as exposing
citizens to asbestos or creating toxic dumps, the tort system altered
their capacity to produce products without worrying about
externalities.
If litigation is indeed increasing, part of the explanation has to
do with the far greater complexity of our society today as compared
with fifty years ago. You cannot have claims brought for defectively
designed automobiles unless there are automobiles. You cannot have
claims for asbestos-related injuries unless producers, manufacturers,
distributors, and installers have produced, manufactured, and
installed asbestos creating the risk of exposure of a known toxic
substance to millions of people. You cannot have massive toxic
harms unless industry contaminates air, land, or water.
As the society has become increasingly complex, and the harms
a single producer or segment of the economy could create ever more
72. It has been estimated that over 600,000 lawsuits have been filed over
asbestos injuries alone. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION
COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT, at vi (RAND Institute for
Civil Justice, 2002). It is unclear how many people have suffered injury but
have not sued. Id. at vii.
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dramatic, the challenges for a civil justice system justified by an
ideology of individualistic dispute-resolution have been profound.
When the issue is the liability of someone who raises a stick to
separate two fighting dogs and who accidentally hits a bystander,
73
the impact of the decision whether to hold the actor liable to the
bystander does not radically impact the rest of the economy-at least
not immediately. If courts find manufacturers of a class of major
drugs liable to thousands of injured patients, however, the effects are
profound-and dramatic.
74
For at least the past fifty years, litigation has been used as a way
to seek redress for social harms perceived as being caused, or at least
enabled by, product manufacturers and distributors. 75 Since one goal
of tort retrenchment is to undermine the capacity of the civil justice
system to address such systemic ills, it is important to identify the
types of cases the civil justice system has been addressing that have
led to increasing political pressure to change that system.
1. Asbestos
Asbestos litigation has become a symbol for toxic torts and class
actions, and represents a major social harm that has been, and
continues to be, resolved through the civil justice system. The
dangerousness of workplace asbestos exposure was known before
World War II, and affected workers in industries later identified as
the primary and secondary manufacturing, shipbuilding and repair,
and construction industries.76 In 1965, the research of Dr. Irving
73. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 294 (1850).
74. The recent and controversial deliberations over whether to withdraw
cox-2 pain inhibitors from the market, combined with the filing of multiple
class actions, illustrate the financial loss at stake for drug manufacturers. See
John Leland, Pain Pills Withdrawn, Many Renew Search for Relief, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at §1-30 (noting that cox-2 inhibitors accounted for
nearly $5.7 billion in annual sales); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1657, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2527 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 16, 2005) (granting
defendant's motion to centralize 148 actions pending in 41 federal district
courts).
75. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 451
(1999).
76. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 72, at 14-15.
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Selikoff and others confirmed the link between insulation and
asbestosis, or scarring of the lung tissue.77
Litigation to obtain compensation for injured workers and other
exposed parties (an estimated 600,000 claimants have filed as of
2000) followed slowly, since the health detriments one suffers from
repeated exposure often takes years to develop. 78 Now, however, the
problems associated with asbestos, and the claims still being pursued
(all estimates agree that at best, one-half of all potential claims have
been filed), 79 are viewed by both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers
as relatively straightforward cases since asbestos is considered a
"mature tort." 80 The term refers to the fact that the scientific and
legal issues of asbestos exposure have been litigated for decades, and
there is little left to discover or adjudicate on an individual basis.
8 1
Frederick M. Baron, past president of American Trial Lawyers
Association, has stated that, "'We have so many claimants, and it's
not rocket science to figure out what they're due."' 82 The number of
claims filed in recent years has increased dramatically, although the
severity of those claims has declined.83 Attempts to pass federal
legislation that would set up a fund to deal with all future asbestos
claims may eventually succeed due to the breadth of experience with
asbestos litigation; the specifics of the fund's size and the fund's
beneficiaries, however, remain subject to debate.
The types of claims and structure of litigation brought by
asbestos plaintiffs have evolved over time. At first, individual
litigants at a late-stage of disease initiated claims; large class actions
gradually followed as both plaintiffs' lawyers and defendant
corporations sought to consolidate suits.84 With time, litigants have
77. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1085 (5th
Cir. 1973).
78. See CARROLL ETAL., supra note 72, at 40-41.
79. See id. at 78.
80. Alex Berenson, Lawyers Silent on Possible Asbestos Trust: A National




83. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 72, at 41.
84. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th
Cir. 1973) (finding defendant manufacturers strictly liable to the decedent, an
insulator of 33 years who died from asbestosis and mesothelioma). The Borel
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brought claims at earlier stages of disease, as medical knowledge,
diagnostic capabilities, and experience calculating compensation
have enabled plaintiffs to recover before experiencing advanced
stage asbestos-related malignancies. Between 1991 and 2000, 89%
of all dollars paid to asbestos litigants were to non-malignant
plaintiffs. 85 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld recovery for
the mental anguish of six railroad employees experiencing
asbestosis, a noncancerous scarring of the lungs, caused by their fear
of developing cancer.
86
Many companies and/or employers against whom asbestos
claims have been brought eventually declared or are in the process of
declaring bankruptcy, or were bought by larger corporations who
agreed to assume the asbestos-related liability. Settlement has been
an attractive option for defendants to reduce future uncertainty about
asbestos liability, although the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down
defendants' attempts to negotiate settlements for all future claims.
87
Halliburton Co., for example, is nearing an anticipated $2 billion
settlement for long-standing asbestos litigation, a major factor in the
increase in the company's stock price in early 2004.88 Asbestos
litigation has bankrupted more than sixty companies, resulting in the
loss of an estimated 60,000 jobs, and an additional 2,000 companies
are being sued. 89 Twenty-two of those companies have filed for
bankruptcy since January 1, 2000.90 At least five defendants have
paid on claims worth more than $1 billion, with the total number of
defendants exceeding 6,000 entities.
9 1
decision paved the way for many asbestos litigants. See CARROLL ET AL.,
supra note 72, at 2.
85. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 72, at 64.
86. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135,141-145 (2003).
87. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
88. James Flanigan, Investors Are Looking Beyond Accusations at
Halliburton, for Now, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at C1.
89. Philip K. Howard, Tipping the Scales, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at
R 1I (reviewing WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS: HOW THE NEW
LITIGATION ELITE THREATENS AMERICA'S RULE OF LAW (2003)).
90. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 72, at 71 ("[W]e are aware of another four
asbestos-related bankruptcies for which we have not yet been able to identify
the filing date.").
91. ld. at 55.
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The challenges posed by asbestos-related harms and litigation
are not yet resolved. For exposures that occurred from 1940 through
1979, estimates place the number of premature deaths attributed to
asbestos-related cancer at 225,000.92 Although a study funded by the
Johns-Manville Corporation projected far fewer deaths, the 225,000
figure does not include deaths resulting from severe asbestosis, post-
1979 exposures, or exposures occurring in other industries.
93
Asbestos claims have posed a major challenge to the civil justice
system, not only because of the sheer number of victims, but because
of the serious impact ,on so many companies. The civil justice
system was not designed from the ground up to administer and
adjudicate major societal harms, but it has grown into that role. No
other social institution is presently situated to adjudicate these
injuries besides common law courts.
At the same time, the asbestos litigation provides a ready target
for retrenchment. Many large companies have asbestos-related
liabilities, and these liabilities are not likely to reach an endpoint
within the next decade. The administrative cost to both plaintiffs and
defendants is large. The risk of bankruptcy hovers over enterprises,
even while disease and injuries suffered by victims remain dormant.
No one seeks to bankrupt an ongoing enterprise responsible for
asbestos-related harms, but courts have continued to hold businesses
responsible for manufacturing or distributing asbestos throughout the
economy. It is the nature of responsibility for a major social harm
such as asbestos injuries, and the degree to which enterprises should
continue to be held liable for future injuries as they occur, that lies at
the heart of the challenge posed by the tort retrenchment movement
to asbestos liability. The civil justice system began hearing
increasing numbers of asbestos-related cases starting with Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 94 in 1974. It is no accident that
the American Tort Reform Association was founded just two years
later.
92. See id. at 16.
93. See id.




In the scheme of social harms, the effects of widespread tobacco
use and addiction tip the scales in a way that few, if any, other
hazardous substances have managed to do. Whether or not litigation
should set policy governing the nation's largest health concern, the
fact remains that the civil justice system has been the primary
medium through which tobacco policy has been set.
95
Tobacco use is the leading cause of death in the United States,
resulting in more than 440,000 deaths each year.96 It is estimated
that regular smoking will lead to death or disability in one half of
cigarette smokers.97 Moreover, at least 27 studies have concluded
that tobacco use is "the single most avoidable cause of disease,
disability, and death in the United States." 98 Smoking rates vary
across racial and ethnic groups, with American Indian/Alaska Native
(AI/AN) adults exhibiting the highest prevalence of cigarette use
(40%), compared to lower rates among non-Hispanic whites
(27.4%), non-Hispanic African Americans (25.7%), and the lowest
rate among the Chinese population (12.3%).99 Likewise, among
youths, AI/ANs had the highest smoking prevalence, at 27.9%,
followed by non-Hispanic whites (16%).100
Findings on the deleterious health effects of smoking have
transformed American culture and lifestyle, not only by raising the
public's awareness but also by sparking a massive image repair
campaign among "big tobacco" interests. The Marlboro Man is
parodied as the "Impotent Man" along a major thoroughfare in Los
95. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and
Public Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 188-89 (2000) (positing that both
private litigation and public State Medicaid actions, fail to adequately address
the harm caused by the tobacco industry).
96. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TARGETING TOBACCO




99. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevalence of Cigarette
Use Among 14 Racial/Ethnic Populations - United States, 1999-2001,
53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jan. 30, 2004, at 1-2,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5303a2.htm.
100. Id. at 1.
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Angeles, l0' smoking is banned in public places such as bars and
restaurants, and commercials sponsored by tobacco companies dot
the advertising landscape with messages aimed at promoting health
and education. 10 2 Many of these changes have arisen as a result of
settlement agreements with tobacco companies, which have required
a reduction in cigarette advertising and decreased accessibility of
tobacco products to youth.'0 3
Until 1994, only two plaintiff claims out of 813 filed since 1954
won against tobacco companies, although courts have substantially
reversed those successes on appeal. 10 4  Many of the arguments
"appealed to a balancing of the social utility of tobacco against the
established harm it causes to hundreds of thousands of citizens every
year, an approach grounded in the Restatement of Torts."' 1 5 By
1999, however, the seemingly impenetrable barriers set up by
tobacco companies to avoid liability were finally overcome. 106
Class action litigation has been the primary tool by which
plaintiffs and state governments have won claims for deception and
fraud (including misrepresentation) against tobacco companies.
Tobacco defendants have tried to remove these cases to federal court
in the hopes that either the class will be decertified, or that damages
awarded will be lower than what they would have been in state court.
Recently, judicial reconsideration of certification procedures and
tightened review of decisions have contributed to a reversal of some
prior plaintiff successes.
0 7
101. See Frances Anderton, Out There: Los Angeles; If Billboards Make It
Here, They'll Make It Anywhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999, § 9, at 2.
102. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, About Us: TV Advertisements, at
http://www.pmusa.com/aboutus/tvads/default.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
103. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATT'Ys GEN., TOBACCO SETTLEMENT
DOCUMENTS: MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, 18-36 (1998),
http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-tobacco.php.
104. LaFrance, supra note 95, at 190.
105. Id. at 191.
106. Id. at 192.
107. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (decertifying a class of citizens and residents of Florida either
suffering from smoking-related disease or who had died, and also reversing the
damages awards, including $145 billion in punitive damages, three years after
one of the longest ever civil trials had ended), review granted, 873 So. 2d 1222
(Fla. 2004) (each side granted twenty minutes of arguments to be heard on
October 6, 2004); see also Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 117 Cal. App. 4th
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Private plaintiffs continue to recover from big tobacco, although
results have been mixed.10 8 In an Oregon case on remand from the
Supreme Court, the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld $79.5 million in
punitive damages, even in light of the guidelines set forth in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. 109
The harms associated with the actions of the tobacco industry
and consumers' use of tobacco are also unique in that they generated
a concerted effort among States' Attorneys General to obtain relief
for the public. Beginning in 1997, State Attorneys General filed suit
against tobacco companies and used their resources to compel the
discovery of key documents previously unavailable to plaintiffs.
This paved the way for punitive damages awards in light of evidence
of fraud and misrepresentation. It also resulted in a Master-
Settlement Agreement (MSA), however, after four states settled
individually and the remaining forty-two reached a group
settlement." 10 The MSA settled with the tobacco companies for $220
billion, but also relieved the tobacco industry of significant
liability."' Lauded by some as "the straw that broke Joe Camel's
back[,]" the MSA resulted in multi-billion dollar settlements with
many states, to be used in part toward paying for smoking-
related health care costs and prevention programs." 2 The federal
government also sued major tobacco manufacturers based on statutes
653 (2004) (smoker and her husband brought suit under theories of fraud and
negligent design after smoker contracted lung cancer. Trial court awarded $1
million in compensatory and $20 million in punitive damages, but on appeal
the defendant tobacco manufacturers were granted judgment on the negligent
design claim and the fraud claims were remanded since the jury was not
instructed that the companies could not be held liable for a ten year period as
provided for by California statute).
108. See, e.g., Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct.
App. 2004) ("[It is difficult to conceive of more reprehensible misconduct for
a longer duration of time on the part of a supplier of consumer products to the
Oregon public than what occurred in this case.").
109. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). But see Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 88 P.3d 497
(Cal. 2004) (granting review to consider the reduction of punitive damages
awarded in previous proceedings).
110. See LaFrance, supra note 95, at 193, 195.
111. Id. at 197.
112. See Florida Governor Hails Tobacco Settlement: "The Straw
that Broke Joe Camel's Back", CNN.com, Aug. 25, 1997, at
http://www.cnn.com/US/9708/25/tobacco. I Iam/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
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allowing recovery for medical expenses and fraud, such as the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). 113
Tobacco policy continues to be set largely by litigation through
the civil justice system. The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the
Food & Drug Act not to permit the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to regulate tobacco or cigarettes. 1 14 While the MSA and other
settlements reached with tobacco companies have certainly sparked
positive changes in the marketing and distribution of cigarettes,
mixed results have been observed with respect to cigarette
consumption and continued advertising practices by some cigarette
manufacturers.' 15 Litigation may continue to play a major role in
shaping tobacco policy nationwide, especially if political initiative to
address the public health problem through legislation remains
stagnant.
Like asbestos litigation, there does not seem to be an end in
sight for tobacco-related litigation. Unlike asbestos, however, which
was abandoned as an insulating product once its harms became
known, the harm of cigarette smoking are well-known, yet
companies remain free to sell and manufacture the product.
Many broad tort retrenchment efforts-such as class action
changes, damage caps, removal of joint and several liability, and
limits on punitive damages-will have a significant impact on future
113. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C.S. § 19611990. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d
68, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("Here, Defendants do not point to any sign that
Congress wished to insulate them from federal statutory rules governing
fraud." Defendants' summary judgment motion was denied.), stay granted sub
nom., United States v. British Am. Tobacco (Invs.) Ltd., No. 04-5207, 04-5208,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11123 (D.C. Cir., June 4, 2004).
114. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120 (2000) (affirming the Appellate Court's holding that Congress did not
intend for the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate tobacco under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
115. See, e.g., NAT'L Ass'N OF ATr'Ys GEN., supra note 103, at
http://www.naag.org/issues/issue-tobacco.php (last visited Aug. 1, 2005)
(citing an August 2001 issue in the New England Journal of Medicine, which
found that the money spent on advertising of three cigarette brands in youth
magazines increased after the settlement was reached). In June 2002,
California's Supreme Court in People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 516 (2003), held that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
had violated the MSA's restrictions on advertising at sporting events.
1046
TORT RETRENCHMENT
tobacco litigation. With respect to tobacco regulation, tort
retrenchment is driven in part by fear of liability for past behavior,
but also by fear of what standards common law courts might impose
in the future. Cigarette manufacturers would obviously like to
instantiate many limits now on the capacities of future plaintiffs to
recover damages, before the next wave of tobacco-related injuries
occurs and litigation begins.
3. Litigation Over Female-Only Products
Injuries caused by products manufactured specifically for
women drove a large volume of litigation aimed at the
pharmaceutical and medical device industries in the 1970s and
1980s. 116 The Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine birth control device
later found to increase the risk for pelvic inflammatory disease and
sterility, and Bendectin, a morning sickness drug administered to
pregnant women that caused birth defects in their children, were
major sources of product liability litigation in addition to asbestos.
Estimates place the number of lawsuits attributed to the Dalkon
Shield in excess of 7,500, involving some 300,000 plaintiffs, and
bankrupting the device's manufacturer A.H. Robins. The social
harm imposed by Merrell Dow's Bendectin similarly impacted large
numbers of women. By the time the product was withdrawn from
the market, it had been distributed to nearly 25% of all pregnant
women in 22 different countries. 118  The safety of both these
products was litigated through the civil justice system, resulting in
massive administrative headaches, as well as huge financial costs.
Prior to the discovery of hazards posed by the Dalkon Shield
and Bendectin, another female-only product exacted immeasurable
harm before finally being withdrawn from the market in 1971 by
FDA order. Diethylstilbestrol (or "DES") was marketed as a
synthetic form of estrogen for the prevention of miscarriages by
116. See, e.g., TERENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE
BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 38-41 (1988);
see also PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 295 (1991).
117. See DUNGWORTH, supra note 116, at 39-40; DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 10
(1987).
118. HUBER & LITAN, supra note 116, at 338.
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nearly 300 pharmaceutical companies between 1941 and 1971.' 19
The drug was eventually banned after it was found to cause vaginal
cancer and precancerous growths in the daughters of women who
took DES. 12  The plaintiffs prevailed against the defendant
manufacturers of DES on a theory of market share liability, because
all DES was chemically identical, most women were not aware of the
drug's manufacturer, and by the time injury arose in the daughters it
was impossible to pinpoint the particular manufacturer. 121
Litigation over injuries resulting from (and allegedly resulting
from) breast implants is the latest use of the civil justice system to
deal with social harms experienced by women. A class action
certified in 1992 eventually resulted in a proposed $24 million
settlement with implant manufacturers that included an injunction
against the further manufacture, sale, and research of silicone gel
implants. 122 Whether or not there is a causative link between illness
and the use of silicone breast implants in women, it is difficult to
deny that litigation was the underlying force in bringing the Institute
of Medicine (IOM) to seriously examine the issue and report the
results to the public. In 1999, the IOM issued a report entitled,
Safety of Silicone Breast Implants.123 This critical report refuted
assertions that proliferated during the 1990s, suggesting a link
between silicone implants and a syndrome suffered by thousands of
women who had received the implants.1
24
4. Dioxin (Agent Orange) Litigation
Dioxin (popularly referred to as "Agent Orange") is the primary
chemical blamed for respiratory cancer and other chronic illnesses
119. Ashley v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms. (In re DES), 7 F.3d 20, 21
(1993).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 21-22. Under the theory of market share liability, as adopted in
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980), manufacturers are held liable for injuries caused by a common product
sold into the stream of commerce, proportionate to the company's market share
of the product in that jurisdiction.
122. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-
10000-S 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21,236, *8-*9 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
123. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS
(National Academy Press 1999).
124. See id at 11.
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among Vietnam veterans. An examination of all available evidence
indicates that dioxin acts as a promoter in the regulation of
cell proliferation and differentiation. 125 Although reports do not
officially conclude that exposure to dioxin in Vietnam causes
respiratory cancer in veterans, the data do indicate that the chemical
persists in the body long after exposure, and therefore, the risk of
respiratory cancer posed by exposure could last for many decades. 1
26
Service personnel and their relatives began filing lawsuits
against dioxin manufacturers in the 1980s. The "Agent Orange"
litigation is an example of how the civil justice system can be used to
obtain crucial information when other avenues are closed. Similar to
the groundbreaking cases against tobacco companies, plaintiffs in
dioxin litigation were able to obtain court orders for the unsealing of
manufacturer documents.' 27 Class actions have been the primary
means by which Agent Orange litigation has proceeded, due to the
large number of potential plaintiffs (tens of thousands), the ability to
fairly ensure that the financial burden falls on the party that should
bear the cost, and the likelihood of encouraging settlement. 1
28
5. Suits Against Gun Manufacturers and Dealers
In 2001, 66% of all homicides were committed with a firearm
(including handguns, shotguns, and other firearms). 129  Notably,
firearm violence decreased 63% between 1993 and 2001.30 Each
year, however, the Department of Justice spends millions of dollars
125. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: UPDATE
2002, (The National Academies Press 2003), http://print.nap.edu/books/
0309086167/html.R3.html#pagetop.
126. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: LENGTH
OF PRESUMPTIVE PERIOD FOR ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EXPOSURE AND
RESPIRATORY CANCER (The National Academies Press 2004).
127. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 148 (2d Cir.
1987) ("Any inconvenience to which appellants are subjected certainly is
outweighed by the enormous public interest in the Agent Orange litigation and
the compelling need for class members and non-class members alike to
evaluate fully the efficacy of settling this litigation.").
128. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 720-21
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
129. See CRAIG PERKINS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, 1993-2001: WEAPON USE AND VIOLENT CRIME 1, 8
(2003).
130. Id. at 10.
Spring 2005] 1049
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1021
on projects designed to reduce gun violence in neighborhoods
nationwide.' 3 1 From 1980 through 1998, firearms were used in
265,252 homicides and 321,355 suicides in the U.S. 132 Perhaps most
notable is the disparity in who is most affected by gun violence in the
U.S. In the early 1990s, the firearms-related death rate for children
less than fifteen years old was twelve times higher than the combined
rate in twenty-five other industrialized countries. 133 Moreover, the
rate of firearm deaths was twice as high among Blacks compared to
Whites in 2001, and homicide by firearm was the second leading
cause of death for Hispanic youth aged 15-24.134
In general, the gun industry is viewed as one of the most
unregulated industries in the country.' 35 Legislation in the area of
gun control exists at state and federal levels, although some criticize
it as piecemeal or not sufficiently far-reaching. The Federal Assault
131. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Justice
Department Awards Washington Over $1 Million for Project
Safe Neighborhoods, (Sept. 30, 2003) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
pressreleases/BJA03163.htm (Project Safe Neighborhoods is aimed at reducing
gun crime by providing existing local programs with additional tools and
funding. Over $900 million in grant funding has been committed to the
program over a three-year period.).
132. See National Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control, WISQARS Leading
Causes of Death Reports, 1981-1998, at http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/
leadcaus9.html (Using Search Terms: Category of Causes-Violence-Related
Injuries Only, 1981-1998) (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
133. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Rates of Homicide, Suicide,
and Firearm-Related Death Among Children - 26 Industrialized Countries, 46
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., 101, 101-05, Feb. 7, 1997,
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00046149.htm.
134. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Web-based Injury Statistics
Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) (Whites had an age-adjusted rate of
9.19 versus Blacks who had an age-adjusted rate of 18.31), at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (Injury Mortality
Reports, Data from 1999 and later) (Search Terms: Cause or Mechanism of
Injury-Firearm, Year 2001-2001, Race-Black and Race-White); National Ctr.
for Injury Prevention & Control, WISQARS Leading Causes of Death Reports,
1999-2002, at http://webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/
leadcaus 1 0.html (Data from Leading Causes of Death) (Search Terms: Year(s)
of Report-2001-2001, Race-All Races, Hispanic Origin-Hispanics).
135. See, e.g., Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming For Accountability: How City
Lawsuits Can Help Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 67,
68 (2002) (pointing out the lack of federal safety or health oversight of the gun
industry, but acknowledging some level of regulation at the state level).
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Weapons Act (FAWA), signed into law in 1994, is one example of
legislation banning the sale of semi-automatic assault weapons, but it
expired without executive efforts to renew it. 136 Assault weapons
such as those banned by the FAWA are preferred by criminals over
law-abiding citizens and have been used in numerous mass
murders. According to multiple reports, crime resulting from the
use of assault weapons has dropped since the enactment of the
FAWA.
138
In the face of this, public interest groups continue to seek more
expansive legislation, such as that which would eliminate attempts
by the gun industry to obtain legal immunity, provide law
enforcement with enhanced evidentiary resources, require criminal
background checks for all gun sales, and improve gun safety
technology. 139  Although state-level efforts to reform the gun
industry have occurred through a mixture of legislation and
litigation, arguably litigation has been the more effective tool for
defeating initiatives sought by gun industry supporters. 1
40
As in the case of tobacco litigation, public entities-particularly
cities and towns-are litigating the harms allegedly caused by the
gun industry in the absence of successful private suits (individual or
class action) and effective legislation. IIl The aims of public
litigation also mirror the tobacco experience, and include curbing the
136. See, e.g., Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Assault
Weapons Threaten Public Safety: The Federal Assault Weapons Act, at
http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues/?pages=aw-renew (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005).
137. See id. (citing a 1994 report by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and pointing to murderous episodes at
workplaces, schools, and public areas between 1984 and 1993).
138. Id.
139. See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Issues, at
http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/issues (last visited Aug. 1, 2005)
(describing the types of legislative action sought and supported by the Brady
Campaign).
140. See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, The Legal Action
Project, at http://www.gunlawsuits.org/defend/defend.php (last visited Aug. 1,
2005) (describing the Project's courtroom success in defending gun safety laws
challenged by members of the gun industry).
141. See Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer Philpott, Note, In Search of a
Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 549, 550 (2000).
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gun industry's marketing and distribution practices, recovering some
of the public costs associated with gun violence, and effecting
changes in gun design. 142 Before the launch of city and county-
led litigation, which began in 1998, the Firearms Litigation
Clearinghouse (FLC) formed in 1981 "to facilitate the reduction of
firearms injuries through the use of the civil justice system."'143
Finally, as with the experience of tobacco litigation, gun industry
litigation has sparked changes beneficial to the public's safety. 144
Litigation initiated by local and state governments has been
based on claims ranging from negligent marketing and distribution to
product liability and public nuisance. 145 Successful litigation against
gun manufacturers and distributors has been slow coming, however,
particularly in light of several setbacks. 146 Critics of the state and
142. Id.
143. See Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Firearms Litigation
Clearinghouse, at http://www.csgv.org/issues/litigation/ (last visited Aug. 1,
2005).
144. See, e.g., Brent W. Landau, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV.
J. ON LEGIs. 623, 626 (2000).
Bob's Sports Headquarters, a gun shop located in the suburbs of
Chicago, agreed to strict guidelines for its firearms sales to settle the
lawsuit brought by Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. Fetla's
Trading Company, a gun dealer, settled a lawsuit brought by Gary,
Indiana by agreeing to cease the sale of handguns and pay the city
$10,000. Colt's Manufacturing Company announced that it would stop
selling handguns to civilians other than gun collectors. And, in the
most significant development so far, Smith & Wesson agreed to a
sweeping set of changes in the way it conducts its business.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
145. See Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, supra note 143, at
http://www.csgv.org/issues/litigation. See also Patterson & Philpott, supra note
141, at 582-96.
146. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (1999), rev'd,
26 Cal. 4th 465 (2001) (Survivors and representatives of the victims of a
shooting rampage by a disgruntled ex-employee of a San Francisco law firm
that resulted in eight deaths and six serious injuries sued the assault weapon's
manufacturer. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate court's reversal of
summary judgment in favor of a gun manufacturer.); Hamilton v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 30 (2d Cir. 2001) (victims of handgun violence
obtained a favorable verdict against gun manufacturers on their theory of
negligent marketing, but the complaint was dismissed on appeal after the New
York Court of Appeals-answering two certified questions-found that the
manufacturers had no duty to control the marketing and distribution of their
products by third-parties, and that market share liability was inapplicable since
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local government suits against the gun industry abound. Some states,
in fact, have passed laws limiting or entirely preempting the ability
of local cities and municipalities to bring suits.' 47 Nonetheless, many
advocates of the litigation point to the decades-long battle to find
success in litigation against the harms caused by cigarettes, and
counsel patience.
In sum, the civil justice system has been the forum in which
major social harms have been litigated. The growth of such major
class actions challenging the safety of products of significant
portions of business enterprises, and resulting in large damage
awards, contributed to the political support for the tort retrenchment
movement.
While one may question whether a different governmental
structure-such as a social insurance scheme-would have more
efficiently adjudicated responsibility and issued payments to victims
in these massive litigations, the civil justice system was the only
institution available to individual claimants to make their case. Tort
change advocates may purport that proposed cutbacks address spilled
coffee cups 148 and overreaching claimants, but the reality of major
guns are not fungible); People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 213
(App. Div. June 24, 2003) (affirming defendant manufacturers' motion to
dismiss after New York's Attorney General filed suit on the theory that
unlawful possession of handguns manufactured and distributed by defendants
constituted a public nuisance), appeal denied, 801 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. Oct. 21,
2003); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(plaintiffs properly showed that defendant gun manufacturers had created a
public nuisance with the manufacture and distribution of their guns, but failed
to demonstrate an injury different from that suffered by the public at large and
therefore their cause of action failed under New York law).
147. E.g., Landau, supra note 144, at 624-25 (in many instances this
legislation has been proposed by, or heavily lobbied for by, the National Rifle
Association).
148. Numerous tort reform organizations, and other independent
groups, used Stella Liebeck's lawsuit against McDonald's as a battle cry
for reform in the mid-1990's. See, e.g., The TRUE Stella Awards, at
http://www.stellaawards.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (showcasing abuses of
the tort system in America and naming an award for such abuse after Stella
Liebeck). For a more complete version of the actual damage sustained by
Stella Liebeck, see Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided
That One Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 2, 1994,
at Al (noting the severity of Liebeck's injuries, and McDonald's refusals to
settle). The trial court eventually reduced the $2.7 million punitive damage
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tort litigation throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is that the civil
justice system successfully adjudicated major social harms, and huge
damages or settlements were rendered against powerful business and
industrial groups.
The growth of tort reform as a political movement parallels
and resists these major social litigations. The tort retrenchment
movement grew in force alongside increased litigation involving
widespread injuries. It may be helpful to understand the political
appeal of tort retrenchment against that backdrop.
B. Expansion of Consumer and Employee Rights
The latter part of the 20th century witnessed important changes
in the power relationship between businesses on the one hand, and
consumers and employees on the other. These relationships are
characterized by ongoing, contractual-type relationships. In this
section, we address how tort law has transformed these relationships
in order to accord greater protections to consumers and employees;
in contrast, increased responsibilities have been imposed on
employers, manufacturers, and professionals. Much of the political
support for tort retrenchment comes from the groups (manufacturers,
employers, professionals) that strenuously fought against increased
duties imposed by the civil justice system. The tort retrenchment
movement offers a channel to scale back those duties.
To summarize the discussion that follows, widespread changes
in tort law resulted in (1) increased consumer and bystander rights
against product manufacturers and retailers; (2) greater power to
investigate and bring malpractice suits against doctors, lawyers, and
other professionals; and (3) important limitations on employer power
to hire and fire employees at will, or to discriminate against them on
grounds of race, sex, religion, handicap, or other statuses, or to
harass them for such reasons. 149 Tort retrenchment challenges these
increased protections for consumers, patients, and employees.
award to $480,000. AM. TRIAL LAWYERS Ass'N, Press Room: McDonald's
Scalding Coffee Case, at http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/
Tier3/pressroom/FACTS/frivolous/McdonaldsCoffeecase.aspx (visited Nov.
30, 2004).
149. Courts also granted increased rights to other groups in specific contexts.
For example, an important series of decisions during the 1960's and 1970's




The transformation of product liability during the first 80 years
of the 20th Century is well known and artfully described elsewhere,
and will not be repeated here except to highlight major changes. The
shortened version of the story is that at one time, the "privity" rule
prevented injured persons from suing negligent manufacturers,
unless they had a direct contractual relationship with the
manufacturer. Therefore, consumers who purchased defectively
manufactured automobiles from retailers could not sue the
manufacturers directly-because they had no relationship with these
manufacturers. In 1916, Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously
abolished so-called "vertical" privity for products cases arising in
New York, thereby permitting a purchaser in the direct line of sale to
file suit against a negligent manufacturer.15 But it was not until the
1960s that "horizontal" privity was abolished, allowing consumers or
bystanders who were not directly in the retail distribution chain to
bring similar suits. 151 This latter development profoundly increased
Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that a landlord had a
duty to offer a reasonable level of protection to tenants from criminal attack);
Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509, 513 (D.C. 1969) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of defendant-landlord and stating that, "modem urban living
circumstances exist which may require that the landlord's duty of reasonable
care encompass steps to deter or prevent criminal acts against his tenant"). In
addition, consumers who held insurance policies were permitted to sue in tort
if insurance companies in bad faith refused to settle or to pay valid claims.
See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967) (permitting
recovery in tort after an insurance company's failure to settle a claim resulted
in a judgment that exceeded plaintiff's policy limits). Furthermore, courts
imposed significant limitations on the capacity of business groups to avoid or
limit these increased liabilities through contractual disclaimers or waivers. The
most famous limitations occurred in the medical malpractice context, e.g.,
Tunkel v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), and in the
context of products liability. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d
69 (N.J. 1960); see discussion infra Part III.B. 1.
150. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
151. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(allowing the wife of a purchaser of a car to recover from the automobile's
retailer and manufacturer for injuries sustained when the steering wheel failed,
even though the wife was not in privity with either tortfeasor). Prosser
described Henningsen as the fall of the citadel of privity. William L. Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 791 (1966). Indeed, Prosser correctly forecast substantially increased
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the incidence of products liability lawsuits, for now the privity bar
preventing suit by anyone injured by a malfunctioning product-
whether or not she purchased the product-was eventually lifted for
relatives and neighbors, as well as bystanders. 1
52
A parallel change in products liability cases, also stemming from
major changes in tort law in the 1960s and early 1970s, likewise
heralded stricter standards of liability for all those in the chain of
products distribution. Beginning with Justice Traynor's famous
opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,153 and buttressed
by increased calls for manufacturers to internalize the costs of
foreseeable and avoidable accidents,' 54 courts began imposing
variations of liability without fault on manufacturers who sold
products containing manufacturing or design defects or inadequate
warnings or instructions for their use.
Additionally, in a series of important opinions, leading courts
began requiring product designers to take into account ergonomic
realities, such as the frailties of potential users or the fact some users
would not read detailed instructions.' 55 In designing vehicles and
other products that might be involved in accidents, manufacturers
were required to consider, as a function of initial design, the
likelihood that their products would be misused, that their human
operators might make mistakes, or that their products might be
exposed to other forces or events such as accidents. All of these
requirements were controversial when rendered, but stemmed from a
products liability lawsuits as a result of the spate of key cases that followed
Henningsen. Subsequently, however, the importance of Henningsen as a
lynchpin of product liability reform declined when the Restatement (Second)
of Torts proposed that products liability be grounded in tort law (not breach of
implied warranty, a contract law concept, as in Henningsen), and that liability
be strict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
152. See, e.g., Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 100 (relatives); Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969) (permitting recovery for a plaintiff
'bystander injured by another plaintiff's defective car).
153. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (holding a manufacturer of a combination
power tool strictly liable in tort for harm caused its defective product).
154. See, e.g., GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-28, 39-67 (1970).
155. See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997)
(design defect); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65
(Mass. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985) (inadequate warning).
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basic insight about the relationship between product design and
social welfare: When manufacturers design products, they should
take into account not only the functional purpose of the product, but
also the nature of the users and the contexts in which their products
might be used. The overarching goal was to reduce the overall costs
of accidents to the entire society. 156
Tort retrenchment increasingly targets this social function of tort
law-forcing internalization of losses caused by avoidable product
design defects-that emerged in judicial opinions and academic
literature justifying these changes. Understanding the attack requires
a brief explanation of the underlying economic theory.
In the 1960s and 1970s, progressive and conservative legal
economists took up the question of how the economic and social
costs of accidents in society could be reduced.157 Both groups urged
that the legal system should place losses caused by accidents in a
fashion so as to incentivize a party who was in a position to do
something about the accident to take steps to avoid such events in the
future. 5 8 Oftentimes, the theory suggested that losses should be
shifted to parties (such as manufacturers or major actors) who had
the information, design capability, and resources to institute systemic
changes. 159 Legal economists differed over the standard by which
the liabilities should be shifted (for example, all agreed that not all
losses should be shifted to actors, but they differed over whether the
losses should be shifted only if negligently caused or under some
higher standard), but most concurred with the general framework for
allocating losses caused by accidents.
At issue, therefore, in recent debates over tort law, is whether a
system that imposes the costs of accidents by locating the "least cost
156. Guido Calabresi's THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS expertly described the
theory. See CALABRESI, supra note 154.
157. See, e.g., id. (discussing the goals of accident cost reduction and
methods for achieving those goals); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-36 (1972) (exploring the hypothesis that
negligence law is designed to bring about an efficient level of accidents and
safety).
158. See CALABRESI, supra note 154, at 26-28.
159. Id. at 51; see also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (arguing that accident losses
should be spread in a manner that results in proper allocation of resources).
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avoider" should be eliminated. Business actors who, through
redesign of their products or modification of their actions, could
avoid or reduce such losses would obviously prefer not to internalize
the costs of the losses. Avoiding liability, however, does not reduce
the harm thus caused; it merely imposes the loss on some other party.
A famous case in the late 1970s captures the moral and
economic force of the new product liability rules. 16  Ford Motor
Company designed a new vehicle, the Pinto, but did not include
several inexpensive devices that likely would have prevented gas
tank explosions in the event of a rear end collision. 16 1  Ford's
designers predicted that, over time, some Pinto drivers would be
seriously injured or killed if Ford did not install the devices, but Ford
concluded that these deaths and injuries did not justify the total
expenditure that would be required if the safety devices were
installed. 162 Richard Grimshaw, a passenger, was severely burned
when the car in which he was riding was rear-ended. 163 Because of
the implied tradeoff between passenger safety and profits, a jury held
Ford liable and awarded $2.5 million in compensatory damages and
$125 million in punitive damages. 164
The theory of tort liability for defective products remains
controversial within the business community, and in some academic
circles. 165 The tort retrenchment movement taps into this
dissatisfaction, urging that different standards of liability--or even
immunities-be employed.
160. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
161. Id. at 359-61.
162. Id. at 361-62.
163. Id. at 359.
164. The punitive damage award was reduced to $3.5 million on appeal. Id.
at 390-91.
165. E.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical




2. Professional Negligence Actions Against Hospitals,
Doctors, and Lawyers
Prior to the 1960s, few cases of malpractice were brought
against doctors and other professionals. 166 Beginning in the 1970s,
however, plaintiffs began suing doctors, hospitals, lawyers, and other
professionals in greater numbers. Why the change? Was it because
patients who at one time might have been satisfied with medical care
suddenly became litigation-happy? Or did these professionals
become less cautious than they were at one time? Or, because of the
rapid changes in medical practice brought about by corporate health
care, did patients no longer feel that physicians knew or cared about
their individual circumstances?
Part of the answer may lie in three key changes that occurred in
malpractice doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s: (1) the widespread
abandonment of the locality rule in the 1970s; (2) the increasing
willingness of state courts to accept testimony from medical and
other professionals located outside the immediate geographical
center of the litigation; and (3) the development of a major new
negligence cause of action against medical professionals: lack of
informed consent. We take up each of these developments in turn.
Prior to the 1970s, most jurisdictions followed a locality rule of
medical practice, whereby medical practices that led to harmful
consequences to patients were judged against the standard prevalent
in the local community.167 A concomitant rule held physicians to the
skill level possessed by "physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability
and skill"'168 within that community. The rationale behind these rules
was that practitioners in small towns lacked opportunities to stay
current with advances in medicine, and would not have the same
modem facilities for treating patients. 169
These locality rules were widely followed until the 1960s, when
courts recognized that they would have the serious consequence of
166. See Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 417, 420-21 (1986). See also PATRICIA M. DANZON,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1985).
167. The history of the locality rule is explored in one of the leading cases
rejecting the rule, Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
168. Id. at 795.
169. See id. at 796.
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enabling doctors in rural locales, or outside urban areas, to follow
standards of care that might have been outdated or rejected in more
progressive or modem medical centers. Indeed, one Massachusetts
trial court instructed a jury that if the "ability and skill of the
physician in New Bedford were fifty percent inferior to that which
existed in Boston, a defendant in New Bedford would be required to
measure up to the standard of skill and competence and ability that is
ordinarily found by physicians in New Bedford.' 70  Obviously, if
the legal rule permitted medical practitioners to adhere to such
inferior standards of practice, it would be very difficult for injured
patients to prevail in malpractice actions against inferior-but locally
accepted-medical practices.'71
Because the locality rule established the standard of care in a
particular community, in order to prevail an injured patient would
ordinarily be required to offer expert testimony from other
physicians in the community that the substandard care violated local
practice and was therefore negligent. But, how would a patient
obtain such testimony? Only from other doctors practicing in the
same locality. Here is where the "conspiracy of silence" came into
play. The local medical establishment, arm-in-arm with malpractice
liability insurers, stigmatized and shunned any physician who dared
testify against any other doctor. 172 Thus, the locality rule practically
170. Id. at 795.
171. The locality rule was subjected to substantial academic criticism. See
Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84
YALE L.J. 1141, 1148 (1975) [hereinafter Comparative Approaches].
172. There were two features of the ostracism practiced against any doctor
who dared testify against another medical professional. One was social and
professional: other physicians in the area would refuse to have anything to do
with the deviant doctor. The other had important implications for the
practitioner's own medical practice: liability insurers often threatened to cancel
policies on physicians who testified against other physicians in malpractice
cases. For a review of these practices, see generally KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra
note 64 at 13334 (describing the history of medical malpractice); see also
Huffman v. Lindquist, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (Cal. 1951) (Carter, J., dissenting):
Anyone familiar with cases of this character knows that the so-called
ethical practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of
the merits of his case ... This is largely due to the pressure exerted by
medical societies and public liability insurance companies...
physicians who are members of medical societies flock to the defense
of their fellow member charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is
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barred most claims of medical malpractice, and the conspiracy of
silence prevented worthy plaintiffs from obtaining necessary
evidence even in egregious cases.
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, responding not only to the rise
of a national market for medicine, but also to the intense criticism of
the locality rule, most states overturned the locality rule. 173 Thus,
patients with meritorious claims were no longer barred from court if
they could establish---often with testimony from physicians from
other states-that local medical practices embraced substandard
care. 174
The other major change in professional standards occurred with
the development of a new doctrine of patient rights-requiring
physicians both to inform their patients of the risks of proposed
surgeries or treatments, and to obtain their explicit consent to such
treatment. This doctrine of informed consent, spurred by leading
opinions such as Canterbury v. Spence175 in 1972, reflected a
dramatic cultural shift in the society.
To simplify this impressive cultural shift, permit us to
generalize. At one time a physician's judgment that a particular
medical procedure was necessary for a patient's health was routinely
deferred to on grounds that "doctor knows best." A North Carolina
case from the 1950s illustrates the point. In Kennedy v. Parrott,176 a
female patient consented to an appendectomy. During surgery, the
physician defendant noticed cysts on her ovaries, and punctured
relegated, for his expert testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or
heroic soul, who for the sake of truth and justice has the courage to
run the risk of ostracism by his fellow practitioners and the
cancellation of his public liability insurance policy.
Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Ct. App. Ky. 1956) ("[the notorious
unwillingness of members of the medical profession to testify against one
another may impose an insuperable handicap upon a plaintiff who cannot
obtain professional proof.").
173. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968); see also
Comparative Approaches, supra note 171, at 1149; DANZON, supra note 166,
at 144.
174. See, e.g., Buck v. St. Clair, 702 P.2d 781, 783 (Idaho 1985)
(establishing the rule that board-certified specialists from any region of the
country may testify against other board-certified specialists practicing in the
same area of medicine).
175. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
176. 90 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. 1956).
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them. 177  Although the cysts did not create an emergency, the
physician believed it was good practice and necessary for the
patient's health that the cysts be punctured, but he did not seek her
specific consent or that of a family member.178  The puncturing,
although performed without negligence, nevertheless led to phlebitis
in her leg.179 Addressing whether the physician was required to
obtain the patient's consent before puncturing the cysts, the court
held that
in major internal operations ... consent ... will be
construed as general in nature and the surgeon may extend
the operation to remedy any abnormal or diseased condition
in the area of the original incision whenever he, in the
exercise of his sound professionaljudgment, determines that
correct surgical procedure dictates and requires such an
extension of the operation originally contemplated. This
rule applies when the patient is at the time incapable of
giving consent, and no one with authority to consent for
him is immediately available.1
8 0
Thus, the physician 's judgment as to what was best for the patient
was highlighted; the patient's own autonomy and right of self-
determination was disregarded.'
8 '
In the 1960s, however, this quaint, paternalistic view was largely
supplanted by a new doctrine of informed consent, requiring
physicians not only to disclose the material risks and benefits of
177. Id. at 760.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 755.
180. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
181. See, e.g., Hunt v. Bradshaw, 88 S.E.2d 762, 766 (N.C. 1955) ("It is
understandable the surgeon wanted to reassure the patient so that he would not
go to the operating room unduly apprehensive. Failure to explain the risks
involved... may be considered a mistake.., but under the facts cannot be
deemed.., to import liability."). See also Michael Justin Myers, Informed
Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1396 (1967) (exploring the
doctrine of informed consent as it existed in the mid-twentieth century and
proposing a standard requiring full disclosure of material risks); Marc A.
Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons From Medical
Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women 's Health and Disability Rights
Movements, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 147 (1994) (discussing attitudes towards
patients' rights prior to the 1960s).
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proposed treatment plans, but also to obtain their patient's knowing
consent. 182 Grounded largely on the principle that patients should be
able to determine what medical treatment is appropriate for
themselves, the new rule led to increased litigation over whether
physicians had adequately informed their patients of the hazards of
particular procedures and obtained informed consent. 83
The upshot of these three developments is that during the 1960s
and 1970s, doctors and other medical practitioners began seeing an
increase in malpractice lawsuits based either on substandard "local"
medical procedures, or the failure of physicians to obtain their
patients' informed consent. In turn, the early 1970s saw one of the
first (of many) "malpractice insurance crises" wherein malpractice
insurance rates increased dramatically. 1
84
There is substantial dispute within the scholarly community
about what prompted the malpractice insurance crisis of the early
1970s. Some argue that insurance companies manufactured the
insurance crisis to justify dramatic premium hikes; others argue that
the rate of medical malpractice claims did not rise significantly
higher than the rate of population increase. Nonetheless, even
assuming that all increased malpractice litigation stemmed from the
changes in legal doctrine described in text, the real question is
whether those doctrinal changes are appropriate, or should be rolled
back. This is the issue that medical malpractice "reformers" prefer to
ignore, and that defenders of the civil justice system have not
sufficiently addressed.
3. Expansion of Employee Rights
In 1964, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964
that forbade employment, housing, educational, or public
accommodations discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national
182. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); In re Swine
Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 533 F. Supp. 567, 575-76 (D.
Colo. 1980); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 N.w. U. L. REV. 628, 639-40 (1970).
183. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781; Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d
670, 672-73 (Kan. 1960); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
184. DANZON, supra note 166, at 60.
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origin, or religion.' 85  The worker protections were eventually
extended to bar discrimination based on handicap and age.' 86 Fought
vehemently by business and industry, these prohibitions eventually
became the subject of intense litigation in federal courts. Whereas
few claims of employment discrimination had been filed by 1970, by
1980 employment discrimination cases were one of the most
important categories of federal court litigation. 187  This new
legislation created an entirely new body of statutory torts, the
contours of which were developed in the crucible of highly
controversial litigation, often with business groups attempting to
restrict the scope of the statutory protections. Indeed, after several
circuit and Supreme Court decisions appeared to cut back on the
reach of these statutory torts, Congress enacted several statutes in the
1990s that restored and expanded these rights.1
88
One of the new claims stemming from Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination eventually came to dominate national discussion
on gender relations: the prohibition on sex harassment. Although
not developed as a separate discrimination action until the late 1970s
and 1980s, the prohibition on sex harassment in the workplace is
now well established in civil rights jurisprudence.' 8 9  These
protections, however, come at a cost: as business groups repeatedly
point out, the cost of employment litigation has skyrocketed, and
liability insurance premiums correspondingly have increased. 90
185. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001) (Equal Employment
Opportunities).
186. 3 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2000).
187. See John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 984-85 (1991)
(explaining that while the general federal civil caseload grew 125% between
1979 and 1989, the employment discrimination caseload grew 2166%).
188. See, e.g., the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259,
102 Stat. 28 (1988) (creating jury trials for damage actions in employment
discrimination lawsuits).
189. E.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
190. The amount of monetary payments paid out as a result of employment
litigation reached a high of $148 million in 2003. See U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY
1992 THROUGH FY 2003, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html;
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002 Directors and Officers Liability
Survey-Executive Summary of U.S. and Canadian Results, at http://
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The goal announced by Congress-to reduce fundamental racial
and gender inequalities in the system' 9 1 -- cannot be achieved without
litigation. Congress recognized that the resources of private
attorneys would be necessary in order to achieve the goal of a
discrimination-free society. Seeking to marshal the energies of
private attorneys, Congress enacted fee-shifting statutes that enabled
successful claimants to recoup the monies paid to their lawyers or
that public-minded lawyers could recover even if their clients were
penurious.
192
In 1968, the Supreme Court famously heralded this new era,
proclaiming that private attorneys bringing civil rights lawsuits were
acting as "private attorneys general"' 9 in both shaping the law and
seeking redress for injured persons. Fighting and remedying
discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion, national origin, and
eventually disability became public policy. But all this litigation
has a cost: the volume of litigation increases, and institutional
defendants expend resources fighting the charges. Insurance against
www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/report/DirectorsandOfficers_
2002/DOsummary2002a.pdf, at 5, 7-8 (describing increase in liability
premiums and number of employment discrimination claims as a proportion of
total claims against employers); see also Wade Lambert, Firms' Legal Costs
Rose 18% in '93 Despite Efforts to Curb Expenses, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994,
at B8, 1994 WL-WSJ 333564.
191. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e-17 (2001).
192. See id. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); see also id. § 1988.
193. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) (per
curiam).
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to
rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad
compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only.
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover
damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone
but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs
were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved
parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress
therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply to
penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be
untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured by
racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
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discrimination lawsuits increases, and money is put aside to both
remedy the legitimate complaints and to fight those believed
faulty. 1
94
Is it worth the increased liability premiums? Is the dramatic
increase in litigation as a result of enactment of the civil rights laws
in the 1960s worth the administrative cost of enforcement? The
answer is yes, if the society is to remain committed to principles of
anti-discrimination. It is "worth it" since rooting out discrimination
"root and branch"'195 can only be achieved case by case, issue by
issue, institution by institution.
Tort retrenchment implicitly challenges anti-discrimination law
when it complains of "too many suits" and increasing costs of
litigation and liability premiums. Defenders of the civil justice
system need to make explicit what is presently implicit: tort
retrenchment arguments undermine anti-discrimination law.
C. Expansion of Duties to Protect Others
Another major development in tort law during the last half of the
20th century concerns new duties imposed on some actors to protect
others from harm caused by foreseeable events that the actors did not
themselves create. In general, such duties owed to others reflect an
attempt to mediate the tension between an individual's desire for
autonomy and the community's need for individuals to look out
194. In addition to the creation of new anti-discrimination rights, many states
also imposed public policy limitations on the "at will" doctrine-which
granted employers the plenary power to hire and fire their employees. E.g.,
Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
See generally, Comment, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the
Employment At Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV.
617 (1981) (explaining scope of public policy exception); Note, Defining
Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981)
(examining the reach of the public policy exception); Note, Protecting
Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983) (calling for broader application of the public
policy exception).
195. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) ("School
boards.., were... clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.") (emphasis added).
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for others. These newer duties nudged the point on the
autonomy/community continuum towards the "community" pole.
One group of new duties breached the wall of individualism-a
view that people do not have to help others in need in the absence of
an explicit agreement to do so. This new set of duties required
individuals to assist vulnerable "others." These new duties should be
understood in general as exceptions to the standard line in torts texts
that one does not have a general duty to aid another in need. Indeed,
the so-called rule of "no duty" has been eroded by many decisions.
One class of exceptions concerns "special relationships," where
there is a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, or
between the defendant and someone who caused injury. Tarasoffv.
Regents of the University of California19 6 provides a common
illustration. In Tarasoff, a patient told his psychiatrist that he
intended to kill his girlfriend.197 The psychiatrist did nothing to warn
the girl, and the patient killed her. 198 The court held that the
psychiatrist had a duty to warn the girl, or to take reasonable steps to
protect her from his patient.199 Similar duties have been imposed on
other medical professionals who have reason to know of a patient's
propensity to injure another.
200
The class of special relationships has been extended to many
other contexts: landlords owe a duty to protect their tenants from
criminal acts by intruders;20' businesses owe a duty to protect
196. 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976).
197. Id. at 432.
198. Id. at 433.
199. Id. at 450.
200. See Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public Peril
Begins " 25 Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. Legal Med. 187, 202 (2000) ("There has
been a continuum of cases based on [Tarasoffs] precedent that have
promulgated a broad duty for health care practitioners to protect the general
public from foreseeable harm."). The Tarasoff duty has been extended in some
circumstances beyond even the realm of the field of health care. See, e.g.,
Mostert v. CBL & Assocs., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987) (holding that a movie
theatre complex had a duty to warn patrons of the off-premises danger of
severe weather after the patrons' seven year old daughter drowned in an
attempt to escape her parents' car when a flash flood hit the complex' parking
lot).
201. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (permitting a tenant to recover after being assaulted and robbed in a
common area of her apartment building).
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customers on their premises from foreseeable criminal acts;202
educational institutions owe a duty to protect their students from
foreseeable criminal assaults;2 0 3 and common carriers such as bus
and train operators owe their passengers similar duties.
204
A second example of expanding duties relates to torts in sports.
In the 1970s, courts tended to see injuries occurring during sporting
events as risks "assumed" by the participants, even though the
injuries might have been deliberately or maliciously inflicted. This
began to change when courts were faced with the choice between
turning away from deliberate injuries inflicted outside the bounds of
the game, or creating a standard that imposed some duty of care on
participants not willfully to injure other participants.
The change in Massachusetts state law is instructive. In Gauvin
v. Clark,20 5 during a hockey match the defendant Clark "butt-ended"
his hockey stick into Gauvin's abdomen in violation of safety
206rules. Ordinarily, such an infraction results in a major penalty and
disqualification from the game. 20 7  Gauvin was hospitalized and
required surgery.20 8 The question was what standard of care-if
any-players in sporting events were required to exercise for other
players' safety. The court adopted a recklessness standard:
The problem of imposing a duty of care on participants in a
sports competition is a difficult one. Players, when they
engage in sport, agree to undergo some physical contacts
which could amount to assault and battery absent the
202. Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Comer, 943 P.2d 286, 293 (Wash. 1997)
(holding that a business has a duty to protect patrons from "imminent criminal
harm and reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct by third persons"). The
court found that the defendant store had a duty to protect a customer who was
assaulted by a group of loitering teenagers as he approached the store's
entrance. Id. at 287.
203. Peterson v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1201-02
(Cal. 1984) (finding a school liable for failing to warn a student who was
assaulted on campus in an area where similar attacks had taken place).
204. Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 914 (Cal. 1985)
(holding that a publicly-owned, common carrier could be liable to passenger
for injuries sustained in an on-board fight).
205. Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989).
206. Id. at 95.
207. Id. at 96.
208. Id. at 95.
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players' consent. The courts are wary of imposing wide tort
liability on sports participants, lest the law chill the vigor of
athletic competition. Nevertheless, some of the restraints of
civilization must accompany every athlete on to the playing
field. "[R]easonable controls should exist to protect the
players and the game."
The majority of jurisdictions which have considered this
issue have concluded that personal injury cases arising out
of an athletic event must be predicated on reckless disregard
of safety.
We adopt this standard. Allowing the imposition of liability
in cases of reckless disregard of safety diminishes the need
for players to seek retaliation during the game or future
games. Precluding the imposition of liability in cases of
negligence without reckless misconduct furthers the policy
that "[v]igorous and active participation in sporting events
should not be chilled by the threat of litigation.
'" 20 9
Decisions like Gauvin have been criticized on grounds that any
participant in a sporting event injured by another player now has an
incentive to sue the player (or the coach, school, or league) for his
* 210injuries. Yet should participants be able deliberately to inflict
serious bodily injury on their opponents in a way that is not only
reckless, but violates safety rules of the sport? This is the question
raised by tort retrenchment.
A final example concerns the development of comparative fault.
The advent of comparative fault in the early 1970s transformed much
of personal injury litigation for the last quarter of the 20th century.
Comparative negligence supplanted the absolute defense of
209. Id. at 96-97 (citations omitted).
210. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 15, 2003, at 42 (cover story) (criticizing "increased" litigiousness among
Americans, including lawsuits by amateur sports participants against their non-
profit leagues), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3660738/site/newsweek (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005); Pete Eshelman, Pass bill limiting suits against sports groups,
FT. WAYNE J. GAZETTE (IND.), Nov. 20, 2004, at 7A, 2004 WL 98778140;
Simon Gardiner & Alexandra Felix, Juridification of the Football Field:
Strategies for Giving Law the Elbow, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189 (1995)
(criticizing the increasing involvement of law in the regulation of on-the-field
behavior in England).
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contributory negligence, so that where once plaintiffs' momentary
inattention or modest carelessness towards their own safety
completely barred them from suit, now they could recover for their
injuries, minus the proportion of damages for which they could justly
be held individually responsible. Comparative fault principles swept
the legal system during the 1970s so that, by the early 1980s, only a
handful of jurisdictions retained the total bar of contributory
negligence.
2 11
The advent of comparative fault transformed the civil litigation
system. Lawyers who previously would reject cases of serious injury
caused by culpable defendants, but where victims had contributed in
some small way to their own injuries, could now bring such cases
knowing that an equitable division of damages would likely result in
favorable damage awards. Indeed, to the extent that there was an
increase in personal injury filings in the 1970s and 1980s over
previous decades, it is logical to believe that some significant part of
the increase was directly attributable to the rise of comparative fault.
D. Recognizing Emotional Harm as a Significant
and Compensable Loss
Early tort law forbade any recovery for mental or emotional
harm unless it was the direct result of a recognized tort. In 1948, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 recognized infliction of
emotional distress as an independent tort, although some states have
been reluctant to adopt that view.21 2 The legal system increasingly
acknowledged the reality of emotional harm as a distinct and
compensable injury in the latter half of the 20th century. Medical
developments in the field of mental health and societal recognition of
the effects of emotional harm have contributed to expanded
opportunities for recovery.
211. In 1975, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804 (1975), the California
Supreme Court'abolished the total bar rule of contributory negligence in favor
of comparative fault. By 1988, forty-four states had overturned the total bar
rule of contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault. See KOENIG &
RUSTAD, supra note 64, at 52. For the early history of comparative fault, see
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., The Common Law is Never Finished (Comparative
Negligence on the March), 32 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 741 (1968).
212. See Malik v. Carrier Corp., 986 F. Supp. 86, 90 (D. Conn. 1997), rev'd
in part, 202 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2000).
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By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the fields of medicine
and psychology had amassed significant research establishing that
emotional disturbances were, as a matter of fact, a mixture of
physical and mental manifestations.213 As a matter of law, however,
the legal field was slower to adopt the view that emotional pain and
suffering were objective phenomena worthy of protection. The
following statement summarizes the general consensus pervading the
profession in the mid- 19th century: "Mental pain or anxiety the law
cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act
complained of causes that alone. ' 215 For many years, this oft-quoted
dicta by Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight served as an obstacle
to allowing recovery for mental harm and acted as a "blindfold,,
2 16
213. See, e.g., GEORGE W. CRILE, THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE
EMOTIONS 93 (Amy F. Rowland ed., McGrath Publishing Company 1970)
(1915) ("The fact that emotion is more injurious to the body than is muscular
action is well known."); Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal
Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 498 (1922) (describing the work of Drs.
Walter B. Cannon and George W. Crile, whose research established strong
connections between emotions and the physical body); see also Fowler V.
Harper & Mary Coate McNeely, A Re-Examination of the Basis for Liability
for Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426, 426 ("It is true, of course, that
all emotional disturbances are at the same time physiological so that the
distinction between emotional distress and physical harm, as usually drawn by
the courts, may not be strictly scientific.").
214. Herbert Goodrich was one of the first legal scholars to acknowledge the
significant strides made in the health field with respect to documenting the
visceral effects of fear and other emotions, such as grief, worry, and anxiety
("It would, I believe, help us in solving legal problems arising from claims for
damages arising through emotional disturbance ... if we kept ourselves
familiar ... with what medical men and psychologists are finding out about
emotion and its effect on the human body."). Goodrich, supra note 214, at
497. For an early case leading toward this acknowledgement, see Dulieu v.
White, 2 K.B. 669, 677 (1901), in which Justice Kennedy notes the judiciary's
growing perception that medical professionals were on the verge of confirming
that nervous shock is or may be injurious to the physical body. But see
Archibald H. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 266
(1922) ("The mere temporary emotion of fright not resulting in physical injury
is, in contemplation of law, no injury at all, and hence no foundation of an
action.").
215. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1936) (quoting Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.
Cas. 577, 598 (1861)).
216. J.L. Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28
GEO. L.J. 55, 59 (1939).
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couching mental pain as "something too elusive for the hardheaded
workaday common law to handle." 7  Common objections to
providing redress for mental harm included evidentiary obstacles, the
risk posed to innocent defendants who might be subject to the whims
of emotionally upset or unstable people, the possibility of fraudulent
litigation, and the difficulty of assessing damages.
218
Yet, with the advent of the 20th century, the work of Drs.
Cannon and Crile, among others, influenced both legal scholars and
judges to the extent that by 1939, Prosser had identified at least a
dozen cases in which the right to be free from mental suffering was
the only interest for which recovery was granted.2 1 9 The field of law,
and torts in particular, was undergoing a reexamination of traditional
rules in light of scientific progress.220  Skeptics' criticisms were
allayed in part by Dr. Crile's work, which convinced many that the
expertise of surgeons and physiologists would protect against
fraudulent claims and keep courts posted as to further research
developments.
221
Indeed, legal acknowledgement that emotions have a physical
impact rising to the level of "harm to the organism" 222 and that such
harm is measurable 223 seemed to follow years of juries feeling
217. Goodrich, supra note 213, at 497.
218. See Borda, supra note 216, at 58.
219. See William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 886-87 (1939). Prosser noted that the
emerging rule seemed to be to allow recovery only for conduct "exceeding all
bounds which could be tolerated by society, of a nature especially calculated to
cause mental damage of a very serious kind." Id. at 889. But see Magruder,
supra note 215, at 1035 ("Quite apart from the question how far peace of mind
is a good thing in itself, it would be quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a
general securing of it... [A] certain toughening of the mental hide is a better
protection than the law could ever be."). Note that Magruder nevertheless
recognized the logic in extending a legal remedy to plaintiffs who experienced
severe emotional disturbance as a result of a defendant's conduct that exceeded
all bounds of decency. Id. at 1058-59.
220. See Lawrence Void, Tort Recovery for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L. BULL. 222, 228 (1939).
221. See Borda, supra note 216, at 59.
222. Goodrich, supra note 213, at 501.
223. Id. Goodrich wisely points out that the inquiry does not end at asking
whether emotions have a physical impact; rather, relevant to the law is whether
that physical impact causes harm that is measurable. By distinguishing
between mere emotions and pain or suffering, Goodrich was able to conclude
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compelled to award plaintiffs compensation for their emotional pain
and suffering, "whether they should do so or not. '224 In this way,
legal recognition of the individual's interest in freedom from mental
injury arose from a combination of scientific findings seeping into
legal scholarship, and long-standing societal beliefs that the effects
of experiencing emotional grief, worry, or anxiety often far outweigh
the physical struggle associated with injury. 225 In essence, judges
and juries came to rely on modem standards to strike "the proper
balance between individualism and the price one must pay to
take part in society," especially considering "modem conditions of
high speed living, and ... standards of propriety, good taste and
decency." 226 Despite these advances in legal doctrine, plaintiffs still
needed to demonstrate some sort of physical impact stemming from
their emotional harm in order to recover.
227
The next step in the legal transformation that brought mental
harm into the realm of legally compensable injury was refining the
element of damages. As the hurdle to proving pain and suffering
that since the physical effect of strong emotional impact can constitute harm
that is both detectable and measurable, "the plaintiffs right to recover for such
disturbance should be recognized." Id. at 503.
224. Id. at 509. Goodrich explains that courts who opined that recovery for
mental suffering not be permitted were the same courts that actually granted
such relief, and also that juries awarded damages for emotional anguish "at a
time when courts were not able to force their conceptions of legal injuries on
juries... the jury always will include it, whether they should do so or not." Id.
See also Borda, supra note 216, at 56 ("It is now evident that the jurists feel
they should afford protection to one's mental and emotional well being and the
pendulum is swinging in the direction of a more liberal doctrine with respect to
this phase of the law."); Magruder, supra note 215, at 1034 (noting and
chronicling cases throughout history in which significant damages were
awarded to plaintiffs experiencing humiliation and mental suffering).
225. For a perspective on the gender differentiation that developed in the
historical treatment of emotional injuries, particularly fright-based harm, see
Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
226. Borda, supra note 216, at 58, (referencing the discussion in Harper &
McNeely, supra note 213, at 456, 464).
227. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at
350-51 (3d ed.) ("'Impact' has meant a slight blow, a trifling bum or electric
shock, a trivial jolt or jar, a forcible seating on the floor, dust in the eye, or the
inhalation of smoke. The requirement has been satisfied by a fall brought
about by a faint after a collision, or the plaintiff's own wrenching of her
shoulder in reaction to the fright.. ").
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became easier to surmount, the greater difficulty resided in arriving
at a standard for measuring this type of damage. 22 8 In early cases
such as those cited by Magruder, juries were apt to award significant
damages for mental suffering, albeit parasitic at that time to the
invasion of other legally protected interests.229  Historically,
monetary compensation was recognized as the only practical method
of redress that the legal system could offer.2 30 Juries seemed to
respond to this concept, and in particular to the idea that intentional
infliction of emotional distress was socially unacceptable. 231 Prosser
also recognized the familiarity of emotional disturbance as an
element of compensable damages, as well as its admittedly difficult
measurement. 2T Despite the recognized dilemma of measurement,
juries have long awarded significant damages for pain and suffering,
even for short periods of disturbance. 233 In this way, legal doctrine
merely followed the growing sentiment of a public that respected the
right to be free from emotional distress.
Following this widespread recognition of mental suffering as a
compensable loss, criticism began to surface with respect to the
extent to which such damages should be awarded, and according to
what standards.234 The effort to "rein in" juries to ensure a
reasonable award of damages is not a recent development in tort law.
For example, in the 1950s considerable debate and analysis was
expended over jury instructions for awarding damages for future pain
and suffering.235 In a number of cases, juries were allowed to rely
228. See, e.g., Marcus L. Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO
ST. L.J. 200, 203 (1958).
229. See Magruder, supra note 215, at 1035.
230. See Vold, supra note 220, at 231.
231. Id. at 237 n.80, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1895) ("There is no general policy in favor of
allowing a man to do harm to his neighbor for the sole pleasure of doing
harm.").
232. William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REv. 40, 43 (1956)
(noting, however, "the admitted difficulty of measuring its financial equivalent
never has been regarded as an insuperable obstacle").
233. See, e.g., Plant, supra note 228, at 200-01, citing Miller v. S. Pac. Co.,
256 P.2d 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) ($20,000 awarded for twenty minutes of
pain) and Norton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 28 N.Y.S.2d 579 (App. Div. 1941)
($5,000 awarded for two hours of suffering).
234. See id.
235. See id. at 202.
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solely on the plaintiffs' own testimony as to subjective symptoms of
pain and suffering. 236  Sedgwick (and other legal scholars) noted
as early as 1912 that, "For pain and suffering ... there can be no
measure of compensation save the arbitrary judgment of a jury.,
237
Cases in the mid-twentieth century continued to reflect this uncertain
standard.238 Yet courts also recognized that pain and suffering is an
individual phenomenon, likely to differ from one plaintiff to the
next.239 Even in the 1950s, judges frequently reduced the amounts of
pain and suffering damages awarded by juries. 24  Despite the
uncertainty associated with pain and suffering awards, however, the
final verdict was believed to reflect a just amount in a majority of
cases.
24 1
In the 1960s, new developments in medical research tended to
dispel the previously held specificity theory of pain in favor of one
that viewed pain as influenced by social and interpersonal factors.
242
Legal scholars reviewing these medical developments asserted that
these new views of pain "pose obvious and direct challenges to the
physiological basis of pain that tort law seems to assume. 243 Thus,
scientific evidence suggested that pain depends on more than just
236. Id. at 204.
237. 1 SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 171 (9th
ed. 1912).
238. See Plant, supra note 228, at 205 n.40.
239. Id. at 206.
240. See id. at 209 (discussing jury verdict reductions in Musgrave v.
Kitchen, 157 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1956); Lange v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 290 S.W.2d
71 (Mo. 1956); Damold v. Voges, 143 Cal. App. 2d 230, 300 P.2d 255 (1956);
and Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953)).
241. Id. at 210-11 (Plant goes on to propose limits on pain and suffering
awards as a way to lend certainty to the process; however, instead of
recommending the modem reform calls for damage caps, Plant thought
limiting pain and suffering awards to a percentage of compensatory damages
would be reasonable, though admittedly arbitrary.).
242. The specificity theory of pain believed pain to follow directly from a
physical stimulus, whereas concepts such as psychogenic pain asserted that
individuals might experience pain that does not originate from either organic or
physiological bases, but rather from psychosocial factors. See, e.g., Cornelius
J. Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical
Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1355-61 (1974).
243. Id. at 1367. Peck suggests that a tortfeasor should not necessarily be
held to compensate for a claimant's pain if social and psychological factors in
addition to the defendant's action could have contributed to that pain. Id.
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contact with an external stimulus, such as that caused by a
defendant's tortious conduct. Legal commentators noted that due to
the overriding social goal of allocating risks and resources in the
most efficient manner possible, however, the possibility that
additional factors not attributed to the tortfeasor could in part cause
the plaintiff's pain should not relieve the defendant of liability.
244
A number of rules were developed to limit or to channel
compensation for emotional injury. The so-called "impact rule"
operated to limit recovery for fright-based and other independent
emotional injuries until the late 1960s. 24 5  At that time, many
jurisdictions began to abolish the impact rule, but retained a
derivation of it in the physical injury rule.2 46 The "bystander rule"
also developed as a mechanism to limit recovery for mental distress
negligently inflicted on individuals not physically impacted by an
event. 24 The physical impact and bystander rules have been relaxed
in some states in the last few decades, but persist in many
jurisdictions today.248
244. Id. at 1368.
245. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 225, at 819. The impact rule
required the plaintiff to have experienced some form of physical contact to
state a valid claim. Id.
246. Id. at 820-21. The physical injury or impact rule required the plaintiff
to prove that his or her mental distress resulted in physical injury. Id. at 81920.
As of 1990, only a minority of states had abandoned this rule. For a
representative case, see Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Mich. 1970),
where the Michigan court stated, "[W]here a definite and objective physical
injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by
defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff... may recover in damages for
such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any
physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock."
247. Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 225, at 821. The bystander rule
dictates that a claimant show that his injury is traceable to fear for his own
safety, rather than for fear of another's safety. Id. Many jurisdictions have
extended this doctrine to allow recovery if the plaintiff experienced fear for
another's safety so long as the plaintiffs own safety was threatened. See, e.g.,
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (permitting a bystander-child to recover
even though the child was not physically injured); see also W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 54, at 361-67 (5th ed. 1984); Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 225, at 821-
22 (1990) (describing the common law's gradual allowance of recovery for
plaintiffs who feared for another's safety).
248. See, e.g., Scott D. Marrs, Mind Over Body: Trends Regarding the
Physical Injury Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and
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By 1970 many jurisdictions were routinely permitting recovery
for emotional distress when accompanied by physical impact to the
person (or a similar standard), or where the emotional distress itself
led to physical manifestations of injury. Still, many jurisdictions
were reluctant to recognize an independent tort in which negligence
caused only emotional harm. In 1970, a Hawaii case paved the way
for unprecedented recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED) absent a physical manifestation of emotional
distress.
249
The adoption by some jurisdictions, and reluctant rejection by
others, of recovery for NIED absent physical injury raises the
question of what sparked this development in the law. One clue is
that much of the judicial discussion on whether to allow NIED
claims centers around cases in which plaintiffs sought recovery for
emotional distress resulting from fear of contracting disease.
250
These claims coincided with the period in which widespread and
large-scale social harms were being litigated through the civil justice
system.251 Thus, as litigation made mainstream society aware of
social issues such as cancer resulting from asbestos exposure and
dangers posed by the release of harmful toxins into the environment,
"Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 ToRT & INS. L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing the
differing requirements to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED) by looking at case law from all fifty states). As of 1992, thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia required physical injury to recover for
NIED (including "fear of disease" cases), while fourteen states rejected that
requirement. See id. at 1. Marrs presents an excellent summary of the general
principles underlying recovery for NIED absent physical injury.
A seminal case was Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)
(abolishing the physical impact rule in California), in which a mother
witnessed her child being hit by a negligently driven vehicle. The California
judiciary shifted the foreseeability requirement from foreseeability of impact to
foreseeability of fright, thereby taking into account such factors as familial
relationships, and refusing to treat the mother as just another bystander-
witness.
249. See Narbeh Bagdasarian, A Prescription for Mental Distress: The
Principles of Psychosomatic Medicine with the Physical Manifestation
Requirement in NI.E.D. Cases, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 401, 408 (2000) (citing
Rodrigues v. Hawaii, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970), in which the Hawaii
court adopted a "reasonable man" standard to determine a finding of serious
mental stress).
250. See, e.g., Marrs, supra note 248, at 2-4.
251. See supra Part III.A.
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individuals were armed with the knowledge that they might be at risk
for developing serious physical illness.
252
Jurisdictions that adopted the modem trend of allowing recovery
for NIED absent physical injury did so out of general concern that
requiring physical manifestation of emotional distress was both
"underconclusive and overconclusive," allowing recovery where
perhaps trivial emotional distress manifested itself physically, and
barring recovery in other instances of "hidden" yet severe mental
disturbance.253 Some states focused on the fact that the goal of
avoiding fraudulent claims could still be maintained, even in the
absence of physical injury, since medical experts could testify as to
254whether a plaintiff was experiencing diagnosable distress.
The impact of mental illness on society, both in terms of health
status and economic productivity, is vast. Significantly, major
depression is the leading cause of disability (measured by the number
of years lived with a disabling condition) worldwide among persons
age five and older, with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder among
the top ten causes of lost years of healthy life for women in
established market economies.255 In the United States, one in five
adults suffers from a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year.
25 6
Historically, mental disorders have been stigmatized. Surveys
conducted in the 1950s and administered again in the 1970s and
1990s reveal that the public's understanding of mental illness has
252. Many of the early "fear of disease" cases, for example, involved
workers who had known exposure to asbestos but who had yet to develop the
cancer associated with such exposure.
253. Bagdasarian, supra note 249, at 412; see also Marrs, supra note 248, at
9-10.
254. See Bagdasarian, supra note 249, at 414-15 (discussing the approaches
in Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, and Oregon). Bagdasarian advocates for
the physical manifestation requirement, but proposes that the test adopt the
principles underlying the field of psychosomatic medicine.
255. World Health Organization, Harvard School of Public Health, and
World Bank, Summary: The Global Burden of Disease (Christopher J.L.
Murray & Alan D. Lopez eds., 2001), http://www.who.int/msa/mnh/ems/
dalys/intro.htm.
256. National Institute of Mental Health, The Numbers Count: Mental
Disorders in America (2001), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/numbers.cfn
(visited Nov. 18, 2004).
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grown considerably over the last fifty years.257  No longer
characterized broadly as "lunatics," those suffering from mental
disorders are for the most part integrated into everyday society.
2 5 8
Seeking care for mental conditions has become more common.
(Even one of cable television's mafia leaders, Tony Soprano,
regularly sees a therapist.) Whereas in the 1950s, people had
difficulty distinguishing mental disorders from ordinary unhappiness,
a 1996 survey revealed a public with a greater scientific
understanding of mental illness, although the social stigma
persisted.259
A poignant example of an emotional harm that has long existed,
but that only in recent decades has become widely recognized and
treated, is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), first introduced into
the psychiatric nomenclature in 1980.260 While the study of PTSD
originated around veteran populations, research has since revealed
that the disorder is influenced by cultural and gender factors, but
does not discriminate with respect to age, sex, or socioeconomic
status.261  In fact, a 1995 study of the U.S. civilian population
estimated that 5% of men and 10% of women will experience PTSD
at some point during their lifetimes. 262 In the days and weeks
following exposure to a traumatic, stressful event, data suggests that
8% of men and 20% of women will go on to develop PTSD, with
30% of these individuals developing a chronic condition lasting for
the remainder of their lifetimes.263 The relationship between PTSD
and the law has been noted; in particular, "[t]he PTSD diagnosis
represents landmark recognition that an external event can serve as
257. Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General 7-8 (1999),
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/pdfs/cl.pdf (visited Jan.
21, 2005).
258. Id. at 6-7 (describing the move away from institutionalization).
259. See id. at 8-9.
260. See Roger K. Pitman & Landy F. Sparr, PTSD and the Law, 9 NAT'L
CENTER FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER RES. Q., Spring 1998, at 1.
261. See National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, What is
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the direct cause of a mental disorder," thus satisfying the causation
element of a tort.26 4
For better or worse, the number of mental stress claims by
employees under workers' compensation increased almost 800%
between 1979 and 1990.265 PTSD, like many mental disorders, has
certain risk factors associated with the condition that may have
implications for its recognition in the civil justice system. In
particular, a history of exposure prior to the causative event (for
example, a prior assault), family instability, gender (women are
believed to be at twice the risk for PTSD than men), lower
educational and income levels, and perhaps ethnicity have been
shown to impact one's risk for PTSD 6. Moreover, results from the
National Women's Study2 67 also demonstrate that the current and
lifetime risk of being diagnosed with PTSD is significantly higher
among victims of sexual harassment.
268
Increased recognition of psychic injury undoubtedly underlies a
significant part of increasing awards for pain and suffering damages.
As society has awakened to the social impact of mental and
emotional injuries, juries-reflecting a greater community awareness
of the impact of these injuries-have in recent years been more
willing to award damages for psychic injury. This is the debate that
must be engaged: Should society recognize and compensate
emotional harm? Or should we require that psychic injury be buried
in our communities without recompense?
E. Dramatic Increase in Business-vs. -Business
Tort Litigation
One of the unheralded developments in civil litigation during the
last thirty years has been a dramatic increase in business-against-
264. Pitman & Sparr, supra note 260, at 1.
265. Id., citing J.C. Decarteret, Occupational Stress Claims: Effects on
Workers' Compensation, 42 AM. ASS'N OF OCCUPATIONAL NURSES HEALTH J.
494, 494-98 (1994)).
266. See Sarah L. Halligan & Rachel Yehuda, Risk Factors for PTSD, I I
NAT'L CENTER FOR POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER RES. Q., Summer
2000, at 1.
267. See Amy E. Street et al., Sexual Harassment, 14 NAT'L CENTER FOR
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER RES. Q., Winter 2003, at 2.
268. See id. at 1.
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business tort litigation. Business tort litigation has jumped so
dramatically that it can fairly be said that much of the increase in
civil litigation occurring during the past thirty years can be
attributable to two things: the "social" litigation referred to above,
and a dramatic increase in the instances of businesses suing other
businesses.
The volume of business litigation mushroomed in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. Moreover, this litigation was not characterized by
individuals suing businesses, but by businesses suing businesses.
Businesses were now using the legal process as one more tool in the
business planning process.
26 9
According to the Wall Street Journal, businesses suing
businesses over contract disputes comprised nearly half of all federal
court cases filed between 1985 and 1991.270 Professors Marc
Galanter and Joel Rogers have argued that the popular understanding
of the so called "litigation explosion" is misinformed:
[P]opular critics of the "litigation explosion" and the
excesses of lawyers typically focus on product liability
claims, other personal injury claims, and nuisance suits
brought by individuals. Seldom do tort reformers admit that
the contemporary surge in litigation, to the extent that it
exists at all, contains a major component of business
litigation.
271
Many corporate general counsels have also taken note of this change.
According to one observer, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, many
corporations increased their legal staffs in response to several
different events. One of them was an increase in business litigation
269. Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1201, 1203 (1997).
270. See Milo Geyelin, Suits by Firms Exceed Those by Individuals, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at B1.
271. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U.L. REv. 1393, 1452 n.294 (1993) (referring readers
to Marc Galanter & David Luban, A Transformation of American Business
Disputing? Some Preliminary Observations (Inst. for Legal Studies Working
Paper No. DPRP 10-3, 1991), in which the authors explore a suspected
increase in business-versus-business litigation).
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that was due, in part, to the increase in suits by businesses (as
opposed to individuals) against other businesses.272
A study by the Court Statistics Project of the National Center for
State Courts examining data from seventeen states determined that,
between 1993 and 2002, tort filings decreased by 5% and contract
filings increased by 21%. Between 1993 and 1998, tort filings
outnumbered contract filings, yet that statistic reversed after 1998
and contract cases in state courts now outnumber tort filings.
273
A similar trend was found in federal district courts in a study
conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice. The study noted
that while tort suits constituted 35.3% of the civil filings in 1971
(22,621 out of 64,016 total suits), they constituted only 24.1% of the
filings by 1986 (38,896 out of 161,724 total suits). Conversely,
contract and real property filings were 22.6% of the total filings in
1971 (14,444 out of 64,106 total suits); yet by 1986, they constituted
26.8% of the filings (43,394 out of 161,724 total suits).
27 4
Why has business-to-business litigation changed so dramatically
over the past thirty years? In part, such litigation is a result of
important doctrinal changes in tort law sought during litigation. In
addition, however, if a business can establish a tort claim, the
damages awarded, including punitive damages, can be astronomical.
For example:
[T]he aggregate total of all punitive damage awards in
product liability cases between 1965 and 1995 is estimated
at ... $1.3 billion over a thirty-year period. That is less
than half of the $3 billion in punitive damages a Texas jury
272. See Liggio, supra note 269, at 1203.
273. The National Center for State Courts Court Statistics Project,
Examining the Work of State Courts, 2003, http://www.ncsconline.org/
D_Research/csp/2003_Files/2003_SubCivil-TORTCON.pdf (last visited Aug.
1,2005).
274. TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PAGE, STATISTICAL
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 13, tbl.2.3 (RAND
Inst. for Civil Just. 1990). Note that the utility of this data depends on the
assumption, which most articles make, that the majority of contract and real
property filings are filed by businesses.
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awarded in a single [business] dispute between two oil
companies-Pennzoil and Texaco--in November 1985. 275
Moreover, the largest verdicts in 2000 included a "$324 million
verdict in a patent infringement claim, a $233 million verdict in a
securities fraud case, and a $181 million verdict in a breach-of-
contract suit."
276
In 2002, eight of the twenty highest verdicts and settlements in
the United States were awarded in suits brought by businesses
against other businesses.277 One suit involved antitrust litigation
between two hospital bed manufacturers, and while it settled for
$250 million prior to the entry of the jury verdict, the jury in the case
had awarded the plaintiff $520.77 million.278 The settlement hardly
indicated an attempt to reduce litigation. Rather, the judge noted that
the present suit was merely "the latest in a long running series of
lawsuits among several related corporations.
' 279
Another suit in 2002, between companies involved in the
licensing and production of medical technology, resulted in a jury
award of $505 million, $400 million of which was punitive
damages.280 The basis of the suit included the tort claim of unfair
competition as well as a breach of the duty of good faith and of the
parties' agreement.28'
These damage awards have included not only significant
compensatory awards, but punitive damage awards as well. A 1996
study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice analyzed civil jury
verdicts in fifteen state court jurisdictions between 1985 and 1994.
Of the 978 civil suits that had punitive damage awards, 462 of those
275. Ronald D. Krist, Wide View of Tort Reform, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 889, 893
(1997).
276. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An
Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 77, 94 (2003), (quoting Gregory
D. Hopp, IT Perspective: Questionable Claims Finding Some Success in Court,
Bus. INS., June 18, 2001, at G12).
277. The National Law Journal's Largest Verdicts of 2002, at
http://www.verdictsearch.com/news/verdicts/special/topl00/nlj 100-1 .jsp (last
visited Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NLJ Largest Verdicts 2002].
278. Id.
279. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722,
722 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
280. See NLJ Largest Verdicts 2002, supra note 277.
281. Id.
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suits (47.2%) were business suits. 2 82 On the other hand, there were
merely 43 product liability suits that awarded punitive damages,
accounting for only 4.4% of the total number of punitive damage
awards. 28 3 There were 19 medical malpractice suits with punitive
damages (1.9%), and 80 landowner liability suits with punitive
damages (8.1%).284 According to one advocacy group,
Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig's on-going
analysis of business tort cases-what they term "Goliath
versus Goliath" cases-shows that the vast majority of
hundred-million-dollar verdicts arise in business litigation.
According to their findings: "Intellectual property disputes,
indemnification of pollution cases, real estate development,
trade secrets litigation, and general corporate bad faith cases
is where large punitive damages awards are more common.
Rand's Institute of Civil Justice, the American Bar
Foundation study, and [Rustad's] summary of all punitive
damages research.. . confirms that if there is any problem
in punitive damages as a remedy, it is likely to be in the
field of business versus business." 
2 85
Another reason for the increase in business litigation is the now
customary use of key tort doctrines whenever there is a dispute over
contracts. For example, if one party to a business agreement
breaches, and the other brings suit, the suit is likely to allege torts
such as fraud, misrepresentation, intentional interference with
contractual relations, interference with business or employment
relations, unfair competition, misappropriation of trade secrets and
ideas, defamation of title, constructive fraud, or negligent
misrepresentation. 286  Indeed, if any business plaintiff's lawyer
having evidence of such behavior failed to allege these torts in the
context of a business dispute, such failure would be evidence of
282. ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 55,
tbl.A.9 (RAND Inst. for Civil Just. 1996).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 54-55 tbl.A.9.
285. Emily Gottlieb & Joanne Doroshow, Not In My Backyard II The High-
Tech Hypocrites of "Tort Reform, " at 9 (Center for Justice and Democracy,
Number 6, April 2002), http://www.centerjd.org/free/Hypocrites2.pdf.
286. See Shigley Law Firm, LLC, Business Torts, at http://
atlantainjurylawyer.com/html/businesstorts.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
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lawyer malpractice in the absence of a good reason not to allege the
tort. It is so common in the world of business litigation to allege one
or more of these torts, that business lawyers create standardized form
paragraphs, and routinely insert them into complaints.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF TORT RETRENCHMENT
A number of implications can be drawn from the foregoing
analysis. First of all, loose reference to a "litigation explosion,"
without addressing why there is increased litigation is both mindless
and irresponsible. For example, it is true that in the last thirty years
there has been an "explosion" of sex harassment claims filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), from fewer
than 6,000 in the 1980s to over 35,000 in the 1990s. 2 8 And what is a
sex harassment claim but a statutory tort? Because of this increase in
employment related litigation, insurance premiums for wrongful
discharge claims (such as sex and race harassment) have also
increased. Millions of hours of employer and lawyer time are spent
responding to these claims. Does this mean we should abandon our
commitment to gender and racial equality in the workplace? If the
sole criterion is a desire to reduce the number of claims, then one
might answer yes. On the other hand, if you think that the explosion
in sex harassment claims is a necessary component to enforcing
ideals of equality, you might argue that, if there were less
discrimination, there would likely be fewer claims.
A second example: One of the trends mentioned earlier was the
imposition upon retail establishments of an increased duty to protect
their customers from foreseeable criminal acts while on their
premises. Many people believe that this expanded duty has
enhanced public safety, particularly where a retailer knows of a
pattern of criminal activity on its premises and does nothing to
prevent further crime. So, should the legal system have created these
expanded duties owed to the public at large? Should we now retract
from these duties? Liability insurance premiums have certainly
increased as a result, but arguably, so has public safety on premises
to which the public is invited.
287. See EEOC, Trends in Harassment Charges Filed with the EEOC, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment.html (last modified July 22, 2004).
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A third example has to do with medical malpractice. Tort
litigation creates important incentives and disincentives for social
actors. In the case of medical practices that harm patients,
malpractice lawsuits serve the important social purpose of
encouraging careful medical practice, and deterring malpractice. Yet
many studies have shown that only a fraction of medical malpractice
is actually reported, and an even smaller percentage of medical
malpractice cases are litigated.288
One question that must be asked, therefore, is why tort litigation
has not been effective either in deterring medical malpractice or in
compensating victims. According to one research report, "at most 1
in 25 negligent injuries resulted in compensation through the
malpractice system" 289 and "only 1 in 5 incidents of malpractice
gives rise to a malpractice claim." 290 In other words, damage caps on
malpractice liability cases have discouraged socially beneficial
litigation that serves to deter medical malpractice.
If the threat of tort litigation is inadequate to deter medical
malpractice, then tort reformers have perhaps unwittingly opened
doors to other types of regulatory efforts to control malpractice. For
example, if tort reform succeeds in staunching litigation, and
incidents of medical malpractice go uninvestigated and unremedied,
we are likely to see increased calls for more governmental oversight
of medical practice, and in other areas as well. For example, the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recently pointed out that
"preventable medical errors in hospitals exceed attributable deaths to
such feared threats as motor-vehicle wrecks, breast cancer, and
AIDS.",29 1 As a result, the NAS study called for the creation of a
288. See, e.g., Troyen Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 370 (1991).
In the Brennan study of New York hospitals, the researchers concluded that
1% of all hospitalizations resulted in patient injury that resulted from medical
negligence. Id. at 373. Of the 306 instances of medical malpractice, only eight
victims actually filed malpractice lawsuits. Id. at 371-72.
289. DANZON, supra note 166, at 24.
290. Id. at 25.
291. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (NAS), To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Report Brief) 1 (Nov. 1999), http://www.iom.edu/
file.asp?id=4117 (last visited Aug. 1, 2005); see also KOENIG & RUSTAD,
supra note 64, at 80; Robert Pear, Protect Patients from Fatal Mistakes, US.
Urged, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 30, 1999, at 10A.
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new federal agency to protect patients. 29  It would be very
interesting to know whether the medical establishment would prefer
a new federal agency overseeing poor medical practice, or the tort
system.
In sum, increased litigation is not an evil if it protects important
rights, increases overall public safety at reasonable cost, or
incentivizes the development of safer practices. If you think we have
"too much litigation," should we abolish the cause of action for sex
harassment? Or should we prevent fishermen from recovering their
losses stemming from Unocal's negligent dumping? Or should we
not require businesses to protect their patrons from foreseeable
criminal acts? Or should cigarette manufacturers have no liability
for putting into the stream of commerce and promoting consumption
of a product that demonstrably injures millions of people every year?
Obviously, there are gradations of argument here: one can argue
that the standard for liability for each of these torts should be higher,
or that recoveries should be limited. But the main point is that to
participate meaningfully in any debate about changing the tort
system, one must be specific about what rules of liability or damages
should change, and why. Therefore, if one objects to the increase in
litigation, one should be called upon to identify specifically which of
the major trends in tort law should be curtailed.
A second implication we can draw is that cutting litigation
claims will do nothing to address the underlying harms that are the
subject of the litigation. Many advocates of changing the civil
justice system seem to suggest that if we merely stopper litigation,
the harms will go away. But this is naive. Barring litigation or
capping damages will not prevent the harm from occurring. Indeed,
the harm has occurred, and the civil justice system is merely the
mechanism we have created to sort through the harms. One can
complain that such litigation is administratively costly and imposes
significant costs on the society, but the civil justice system is just the
bearer of the bad news. Curtailing litigation will not curtail the
harms that litigation serves to redress. It will merely shunt those
losses into some other comer of a society ill equipped to address
them.
292. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 291, at 3.
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When performing its adjudicative role, the civil justice system
serves two important sorting functions. The first function separates
compensable harms from harms that will not be redressed. The
second function adjudicates who should pay for those harms that are
compensable. We address each function in turn.
The sorting function is performed by institutional actors (judges,
legislatures, and juries) who establish the rules (judges and
legislatures) and then apply them to specific settings (judges and
juries). Sorting results in determining that a significant percentage-
most studies indicate more than half--of all cases that are filed in
court will not be found to have met the standard of proof. Thus, half
of all injured persons-or persons who believe they have been
injured by the conduct of others-go uncompensated.
Suppose we curtail all future asbestos litigation, as advocated by
some "tort reformers," and summarily dismiss the 100,000 asbestos
cases presently "clogging the courts," as one so-called reform group
293put it. If we dismiss asbestos claims from the civil justice system,
we have not solved the problem that real people have suffered real
injuries resulting from the operations of a complex society that
creates toxic products. We also have not dealt with the reality that
very responsible corporate defendants made very irresponsible
decisions incorporating asbestos into thousands of homes,
businesses, and schools, and exposing millions of people to the
hazards of a dangerous product.
294
But even putting the complex issue of responsibility aside, by
summarily dismissing the asbestos cases from the civil justice
system, we succeed merely in shunting the problem of how to deal
with these 100,000 cases of injury resulting from asbestos to some
other social venue. What will happen to the injured? Maybe our
293. See, e.g., Institute for Legal Reform, Issues-Asbestos, at
http://www.legalreformnow.com/issues/asbestos.html (last visited Aug. 1,
2005) ("Hundreds of thousands of asbestos claims are clogging state and
federal courts across the country, and thousands of new claims are being filed
every year.").
294. We are very much aware that the issue of responsibility for harms
resulting from asbestos is far more complex than the text would indicate. But
the point is that absolving the group of asbestos defendants from further
liability does not solve the problem that a few hundred thousand people
continue to suffer from harms caused by asbestos.
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public hospitals are wealthy enough to accommodate a huge influx of
new non-paying clients. Maybe our federal government will have
enough foresight to establish a new benefits program to deal with the
long-term issues created by this substance. Maybe our state
governments will find a way to expand health care to workers
incapacitated by asbestos. Or, more likely, maybe we will just shove
another critical issue of public health under the bulging carpet and
hope none of those victims have enough power to make a stink.
When one sets out to reform the civil justice system, one must
examine unintended consequences of those reforms on the public
health system in the country. If products liability litigation is
curtailed, what will happen to the victims of injuries caused by
products? For example, the Chair of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission testified that consumer product injuries alone accounted
for one of every six hospital days in the country.2 95 What are the
implications for the public health systems in this country if tort
retrenchment succeeds in cutting back on products liability
litigation? This is an important question for any proposal to reform
the civil justice system.
The second function the civil justice system serves is to
determine, out of the harms determined to be compensable, who will
pay for the harms. We can call this decision of "who should pay" a
question of legal responsibility. We should now like to turn to the
question of how we define "legal responsibility."
Over the last few hundred years, the question of how to define
legal responsibility has occupied the minds of many jurists and
scholars. Some early notions of responsibility identified the
responsible agent as the live thing that caused harm.29 6 So, if your
bull gored me, we might have a trial on the question of whether the
bull should be put to death.
In recent decades, however, the theory of how liability should be
assessed has shifted from an effort to place blame on particular
actors to a much more overarching goal of reducing overall social
295. See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, REGULATORY
REFORM INITIATIVE (Summary Report, CPSC Document #8005, June 1995), at
http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/8005.html.
296. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 10-12 (1963 ed.).
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harms. The focus has turned from personal moral blameworthiness
to overall social welfare.
In objecting to expansive liability doctrines for preschools, it
might be convenient to pretend that lawsuits attempting to hold
preschools liable for damages to children molested by their teachers
are responsible for increased liability insurance premiums. Or those
advocating a return to immunities for charities might argue that the
Catholic Church should not be held liable for shielding from
discovery the pedophilia of a priest. On the other hand, children
have been injured, and those injuries will not go away merely
because lawsuits against preschools or churches are barred.
In sum, a loss has occurred. The important question is who
should pay for the loss. The tort system is serving a distributional
function-shifting losses from the plaintiff to the defendant. If you
object to the distributional consequences, don't pretend that by
barring lawsuits the losses will magically disappear.
V. CONCLUSION
In any system set up to adjudicate millions of injuries every
year, there will be errors, misjudgments, and results that many
people will find unfortunate, if not outrageous. But "argument by
anecdote" 297 will not capture the real debate going on over the reach
of the civil justice system. Our view is that the real focus of the
current set of critiques is the 80 years of legal ferment that
transformed civil justice during the first part of the 20th Century.
However, neither the proponents of retrenchment nor the defenders
of the tort system have acknowledged that the 1900-1980 changes in
tort law undergird the post-1975 tort retrenchment movement. We
think that public discourse would be vastly improved if this were the
focus of the argument.
The tort retrenchment movement can claim many successes. It
has succeeded in politicizing the system of civil justice, and brought
its contentions into every state legislature in the country, as well as in
Congress. The debate asks us who should pay for losses that a
297. The movement for tort retrenchment gained a lot of traction over
repeated and often inaccurate descriptions of the so-called "McDonald's
coffee" case. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419,
1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994).
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complex post-industrial society creates. It is also a debate about
allocating legal responsibility for loss, such as whether we should
shift losses from those unlucky enough to hold winning tickets in a
catastrophic lottery to those who are responsible for or at least could
have prevented the loss. It also questions how we should measure
those losses. At the core, these are indeed political, moral, and legal
debates.
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